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THE TYRANNY OF TIME:
VULNERABLE CHILDREN, “BAD” MOTHERS, AND STATUTORY
DEADLINES IN PARENTAL TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS
Catherine J. Rosss

In child welfare disputes, protections accorded to one party—parent, state, child or
foster parent—almost inevitably diminish the substantive interests of another.1 Once a child
is placed in foster care, the inexorable progress of the case will presumably lead to only one
of two options: return to the family of origin or termination of parental rights followed by
permanent placement in another family. Thus, from the time a child enters foster care the
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Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U .S. 81 6, 84 6 (1977 ) (Brennan, J.)
(“[O]rdinarily procedural protection may be afforded to a liberty interest of one person without derogating
from the substantive liberty interest of another. Here, [disputes over removal of children from foster
families] such a tension is virtually unavoidable.”).
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potential exists for the interests of child and parent to diverge dramatically. The conflicting
interests of child and parent are often transparent from the day the case file is opened. In
other instances, however, where the state plans simultaneously for reunification or
termination of parental rights,2 the conflicting interests of child and parent are balanced
against their potential mutual interests as the case progresses.
The conflicting interests and resulting tensions that can arise among parents, children
and the state are particularly pronounced when the state seeks to terminate parental rights.
These tensions have long been aggravated by the inability of the child welfare system to find
the proper balance between two competing imperatives. The first requires the state to
protect children who are the victims of serious abuse or neglect and who, it is widely
understood, may suffer repeated trauma, and even death, if the state fails to intervene
appropriately. The second imperative is to minimize the psychological and social trauma
that children often suffer when the state intervenes to remove them from the families that
have failed to meet their basic needs.
No one disputes that the stakes in parental termination cases are high. Every current
member of the Supreme Court agrees that “[f]ew consequences of judicial action are so
grave as the severance of natural family ties.”3 Although the cases before the Court have
focused primarily on the legal significance and emotional devastation of termination for

2

Federal legislation requires that child welfare agencies engage in “concurrent planning” in which they
develop plans for both the contingency that a child returns home after foster care and the contingency that
the rights of the child’s biological parents will be terminated and the child will be free to enter a permanent
placement with another family. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, §101 (a), 111
Stat. 2115 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (199 7)).
3

M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 787
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 519 U.S. at 144 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[F]or many – if not most – parents,
the termination of the right to raise their children would be an exaction more dearthan any other.”). See also
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (Blackmun, J.) (“Few forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible.”).
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parents, separation from a parent is at least as grievous and traumatic for the children
involved.4 However, the interest that a child may have in preserving a relationship with a
neglectful parent has received short shrift in the wake of recent federal reforms intended to
ensure permanent placements for all children within a short time after their entry into the
foster care system.
Historically, when the state has chosen to respond to the plight of neglected children,
it has done so paternalistically. The traditional patriarchal ideal of family life did not accord
children either autonomy or independent legal rights. Modern rights theory, however, has
recognized that minors may have legal claims independent of their parents that extend
beyond their need for nurturance as members of an intimate association of family members.
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) states “explicitly for the first time in
Federal law that a child’s health and safety must be the paramount consideration when any
decision is made regarding a child in the Nation’s child welfare system.”5 In doing so,
ASFA places the potential conflicts of interest between children and their parents (in most
instances their mothers) in stark relief.6 ASFA makes permanency “in a safe and stable
home, whether it be returning home, adoption, legal guardianship, or another permanent

4

See generally J O S E PH G O LD ST EIN , A LBERT J. S O LN IT , S ONJA G O LD S T EIN & THE LATE A NNA F R E U D , I N
B EST I NTERESTS OF THE C HILD : T HE L EAST D ETR IMEN TAL A LTERNATIVE (1996) (app lying
psycholana lytic theory to the problem of state interve ntion in child placement and emp hasizing the child’s
psychological need for continuity in a relationship w ith a prim ary caretaker); J O H N B OWLBY ,
A T T AC H M E N T A N D L OSS (1969) (exam ining the im portance of a warm, intimate and continuous relationship
with a mother figure to a child’s positive d evelo pme nt.).
THE

5

Strengthening Abu se and Neglect Courts A ct of 20 00, P ub. L. 106 -314 , 114 Stat. 12 66, (2 000 ) § 2 (2);
See also Pub. L. 105-89 § 101 (a), 42 U.S.C.S. § 671 (a) (15) (A) (“[T]he child’s health and safety shall be
the paramo unt concern[]”).
6

Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (1998)).
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placement” the goal for all of the children who enter foster care.7 In keeping with its
laudatory goal of moving children quickly out of the child welfare system to some form of
stability, ASFA imposed an innovative federal time line, intended to insure that no child
lingered in foster care for a period of years. By making the child’s safety and development
the priority, ASFA weighs the child’s security more heavily than the mother’s emotional
needs and legal rights. Looking at ASFA from the perspective of children’s rights, it is hard
to see any drawbacks to ASFA’s categorical approach as applied to the bright line cases.
Like ASFA, this paper is not concerned with the life circumstances that may have led the
“abusive” mother to her predicament or her actions.8 This article is instead concerned with
those cases that lie outside bright-line labels and examines a paradox at the heart of recent
efforts to improve the child welfare system: in their zeal to focus on the child in parental
termination hearings, lawmakers imposed a categorical formula that unwittingly harms some
children and mothers who are labeled “unfit” because of neglect.
In the cases at the margins, those involving mothers who may or may not be
neglectful, or who are victims in their own right, ASFA’s categorical treatment of mothers
and children may not serve all children equally well. Unfortunately, the marginal cases are
not rare.9 In this paper, I aim to highlight a dilemma central to the child welfare system: it
may not be possible to devise a legal principle that equitably addresses the interests of all
neglected children and their mothers. Attempts to impose such a categorical legal principle
7

Executive M emo randum on Ad optio n and Alterna te Permanent Placem ent of C hildren in the Public C hild
W elfare System, 32 W eekly C omp . Pres. Doc. 2513 (Dec. 14, 199 6).
8

In using the term “abusive,” I refer to the abusers whose label raises no questions - - those who torture,
drown, or fail even to note that a child has disappeared.
9

A M . B AR A SS ’N P RES IDEN TIAL W ORKING G ROUP ON THE U NMET L EGA L N EEDS O F C H IL DR E N AN D T H EIR
F AMILIES , A MERICA ’S C HILDREN AT R ISK 50 (1993 ) (“Only about 10% of the cases in which states remove
children from their homes involve severe physical injury or severe sexual abuse.”).
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to neglect cases may result in less than optimal solutions for some individual children and
mothers, and even instances of flagrant injustice to one or both. On the other hand, it is
incumbent upon the law, and on its theorists as well as its practitioners, to grapple with the
hardest issues, such as how the passage of time affects the respective claims of a parent, a
child and the state in the child welfare system.
Section I of this essay reviews the rights claims of parents generally, of mothers
in particular, and of children. Section II analyzes the key reform of ASFA, which
provides that parental rights be terminated after a child has remained in foster care for 15
out of the preceding 22 months. In doing so, I consider the conflicting interests and
postures of the child, the mother and the state, asking whether the passage of time alone
is ever sufficient justification for terminating parental rights in light of the protections the
law affords parents. Section III considers two categories of hard cases which
demonstrate the vital liberty interests and practical needs of mothers and children: (1)
cases involving substance abusing mothers and (2) cases involving battered mothers
whose children were removed despite the mother’s success in protecting the child from
observing or experiencing violence. Both of these categories illustrate that, in some
instances, children’s interests might be better served by flexibility where the child asserts
a claim to a continued relationship with a biological parent.

5

I. Rights Perspectives: Parents, Women and Children
The vast majority of children live with their mothers, whether in single parent
households, with their father as well as their mother, or with their mother and her significant
other 10 This necessarily means that where abuse or neglect takes place, a mother’s role is
likely to be at issue, either as a perpetrator, for placing the child in harm’s way, or for failure
to protect the child from another adult. Indeed, when we talk about child abuse and neglect
we are almost always talking, at some level, about mothers and their children, even if the
mother’s partner is the abuser.
This section first considers the constitutional rights accorded to parents, regardless of
sex, and the ways in which those rights diminish the independent claims of children. It then
considers the role of feminist theory in discussions of the rights of mothers and children in
the context of child abuse and neglect. Finally, it offers a way of thinking about children’s
legal claims within the child welfare system separate from those of their parents, with
particular emphasis on the legal regime created by ASFA.

10

According to the 2000 census, of the 37 million families with children in the United States, roughly ten
million families are headed by a single mo ther, and two m illion families by a single father. Jason Fields &
Lynne M. Casp er, Am erica’s Fa milies a nd L iving Arra nge ments, C URRENT P O P U LA T IO N R EPORTS , June
200 1, at 6-7 (U.S. Census Bureau 200 1). Five percent of all children live with a single father without their
mother or another female partner be ing pre sent. Id. at 7. See also Jason Field s, Living Arrangements of
Children, C URRENT P O P U LA T IO N R EPORTS , April 2001, at 5-6 (U.S. Census Bureau 2001)(comparing 1996
U.S. Census statistics concerning num bers of children residing with unmarried mothers and fathers). Most
of the remaind er live with a married o r unmarried couple, which includes one of their parents. Fields &
Casp er, supra, at 13. Another 1.3 million children live with a grandparent, without either parent. Fields,
supra, at 12. A lthough the census data are not specific, exp erience indicates that children living with their
grandparents are likely to be living with a grandmother.
As Annette Appell has pointed out, “the constitutional definition of parent differentiates between women as
mothers and men as fathers. . . . Parenthood to date requires a biological connection between the mother
and child; a nurturing connection between the prospective other parent and the mother; or a nurturing and
genetic connection to the child” for those who c laim fatherhoo d. Annette Ruth Ap pell, Virtual M others
and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. M ICH . J. L. R EFORM 683, 694 (2001).

6

A. Parental Liberty Interests and Due Process Rights
Even in the context of the modern child welfare system, the constitutional rights of
parents frequently subsume the legal rights of their children.11 The Supreme Court has
found a substantive liberty interest in parenting,12 which “does not evaporate simply because
[the parents] have not been model parents or have lost temporarily the custody of their child
to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”13 The resulting legal
presumption that parents speak for their children does not fully evaporate once the children
come to attention of a child welfare agency, or even once a child enters foster care. Under
this legal regime, as opposed to a therapeutic one, information must be considered in a
certain order. Before a court can assume that the child or someone else claiming to speak
for the child (such as the state or an appointed guardian ad litem) is in a better position than
the parent to present the child’s best interests to the court, the court must determine that the
parent has behaved in a way that justifies stripping the parent of her presumed identity of
interests with her child. Only after such a finding may a court determine that the parent no
longer speaks for this particular child. Consequently, any legislative initiative designed to
11

I have argued elsewhere that minors should and do have legal rights independ ent of their parents.
Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U. P A . J. C ONST . L. 223
(1999) [hereinafter An Emerging Right]; Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing
Counsel for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FO R DH A M L. R EV . 1571 (199 6) [hereinafter Vulnera bility to
Voice].
12

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U .S. 510 (1925 ); M.L.B. v. S. L. J. , 519 U .S. 102, 119 (199 6) (the Lassiter and Santosky
courts were “unanim ously of the view that ‘the interest of parents in their relationship with their child ren is
sufficiently fund amental to co me within the finite class of liberty interests p rotected by the Fo urteenth
Amendment.’,” quoting San tosky v. K rame r, 455 U.S. 745 , 774 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting )). See
David D . Meyer, Loch ner Re deem ed: Fa mily Priva cy After Tro xel and Carhart, 48 U CLA L. R EV . 1125
(2001); David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 V A N D . L. R EV . 527 (20 00).
13

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
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elevate the child’s developmental needs over the rights of his or her parents may conflict
with generally applicable constitutional principles protecting the family unit as a whole. It is
critical, therefore, to understand the scope and strength of the parent’s rights before seeking
to explicate the balance of interests between children and their parents in the context of the
child welfare system.
The substantive due process jurisprudence that governs claims involving a parent’s
liberty interest in his or her child requires a court to engage in strict scrutiny of government
intervention. In short, any infringement on the parent’s rights must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.14 But while the government’s compelling interest in
safeguarding children is rarely questioned, the means the government uses to achieve its
goals are frequently the subject of litigation.15
The liberty interest of parents in their children also mandates procedural protections
before a parent’s rights may be terminated. In the 1972 case of Stanley v. Illinois the
Supreme Court held that a state may not deprive a parent of his or her parental rights without
an individualized determination of the parent’s fitness.16 Speed and efficiency, the Court
declared, may not be allowed to run “roughshod over the important interests of both parent
and child.”17 In subsequent cases the Supreme Court examined three procedural issues that

14

In re H.G., 757 N .E.2d 864, 87 1 (Ill. 2001).

15

See Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children from
Controversial Speech, 53 V A N D . L. R EV . 427, 463 -67 [hereinafter Anything Goes] (discussing the lack of
judicial scrutiny accorded to the state’s claims of a compelling interest in protecting children in the context
of regulations on controversial speech).
16

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (19 72).

17

Id. at 657.
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arise in termination cases: the right to appointed counsel, the standard of proof, and the right
to an appeal.
In its 1981 opinion in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court held
that due process does not require appointment of counsel for parents in all termination
proceedings.18 The Lassiter opinion makes clear, however, that an appellate court may
reverse a trial court’s decision not to appoint counsel if the decision violates fundamental
fairness under the facts of the case.19 In addition, although the Court found that
appointing counsel is not constitutionally required in all termination cases, the majority
noted that a “wise public policy” would require appointing counsel for parents who
cannot afford attorneys at all stages of dependency proceedings.20
The Supreme Court has ruminated on the high personal stakes that make termination
of parental rights something more than an “ordinary civil action” resulting in “‘mere loss of
money.’”21 In Santosky v. Kramer, decided the year following Lassiter, the Supreme Court
18

Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981 ) (While Justice Powell took no part in the
consideration or voting in Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), he voted with the five person majority in Lassiter).
19

Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27-28, 31-32 (applying formula set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976)).
20

Lassiter , 452 U.S. at 33-34. At the time Lassiter was decided, the Court noted that thirty-three states and
the District of Columbia provided appo inted counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings, and
that nothing suggested that such statutes were other than “enlightened and wise.” Id at 34. Since Lassiter
was decide d, the wave o f opinio n in the states has become even m ore p rono unced. See Brown v. Division
of Family Services, 803 A.2d 948, 952-53 (Del. 2002) (since Lassiter was decided, “there have been
substantial dynamic statutory and procedural developments” regarding the right to counsel in termination
of parental rights proceedings). In 2002, the Supreme Court of Delaware noted that Delaware was one of
only five states that have not “established a right for ind igent parents to be represe nted b y counsel at State
expense in dependency and neglect proceedings…. [either by statute] or as a matter of state constitutional
law.”Brown, 803 A.2d at 955. Nonetheless, like most other states, De laware “routinely appoints” counsel to
indigent pare nts who request it. Id. at 957-58 (holding that D elaware must provide tim ely notice to parents
that they m ay have a right to representation at the state ’s expe nse in term ination p roceedings and expressly
reserving the question of whether indigent parents are entitled to state-appointed counsel at all stages of
dep endency and neglect proceedings).
21

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 747, 756 (19 82).
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held that in light of the stakes in termination proceedings, due process requires that the state
support its allegations by an elevated evidentiary standard -- “at least clear and convincing
evidence” -- before it may “sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their
natural child.”22
Most recently, in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the Supreme Court held that the due process and
equal protection clauses mandate that a state may not deny appellate review to a person
whose parental rights have been terminated. The Court held that states must provide every
parent with access to the appellate courts following termination of parental rights regardless
of the parent’s ability to pay the requisite costs.23 In the context of a contested step-parent
adoption, the M.L.B. majority again focused on the substantial and irreparable injury to
parents who lose all rights to their children, as well as the potential for judicial error, in
holding that “decrees forever terminating parental rights” fall into “the category of cases in
which the State may not ‘bolt the door to equal justice.’”24 The Court, however, did not
balance the child’s potential interests against the parent’s rights, and did not have before it
the argument that delay—whether caused by the appellate process or by other
contingencies— unjustly prolongs the child’s uncertainty about her fate.
The cases from Lassiter through M.L.B. establish the parameters of the rights and
presumptions that parents bring to termination proceedings. These constitutional protections
for parents are critical, especially since the fact-finding stage of a termination proceeding

22

Id. at 747-48.

23

M.L.B . v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 , 107 (1996 ) (holding the state may not block an appeal by an indigent
parent who cannot afford to purchase a copy of the trial transcript).
24

Id. at 124.
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“pits the state directly against the parents.”25 At this stage, the trial court’s task is limited to
determining whether “the natural parents are at fault.”26 This finding of “fault” is
understood to be a prerequisite for the conclusion that these particular “parents are unfit to
raise their own children.”27 Because it is assumed that children are generally best served by
remaining with their parents, and a finding of fault could lead to their permanent removal
from their parents’ care, courts presume that the interests of children converge with the
interests of parents at legal proceedings. This presumption remains, even where the facts
appear to clearly rebut it.28 In Santosky, for example, the parents’ interests were viewed as
converging with their children’s despite the fact that one boy, who had been removed from
his parents when he was only three days old, was seven when the case was argued and had
never lived with his parents.29 Yet even on those facts, the Court preserved the legal fiction
that parents and child speak with one voice, insisting “until the State proves parental
unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination
of their natural relationship;” only after the State proves parental unfitness, are the interests
of parent and child deemed to “diverge.”30

25

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 .

26

Id.

27

See Id. at 760 & n.10.

28

Id. ; See Ross, Vulnerability to Voice, supra note 11, at 1579-86.

29

Santosky 455 U.S. at 751, 760-61 nn.10-11.

30

Id. at 760.
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The Supreme Court has expressed doubts about whether “the State constitutionally
could terminate a parent’s rights without showing parental unfitness,” although it has never
directly confronted the question.31 In obiter dicta, the Court opined that
[w]e have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended '[if] a
State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the
objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of
unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the
children’s best interest.’32
Notwithstanding the due process protections accorded the liberty interest of
biological parents in their children, once a child enters foster care, the parental rights and
responsibilities for that child are apportioned among biological parent, foster parent and the
state.33 The manner of this division resembles nothing so much as the proverbial bundle of
sticks well known in introductory law school property classes, reminding us of the long
common law history of treating children as property.34 No matter how long the child remains
in foster care, he or she continues to “belong” to the natural parent in some respects.35 That
natural parent – although stripped of custody and day-to-day decision making once a child
enters foster care retains the sole ability to make decisions regarding surgery and the right to
31

Id. at 760 n.10.

32

Quillo in v. W alcott, 434 U .S. 24 6, 25 5 (1978 ) (quo ting Sm ith v. Org. of Fo ster Families for Equal. &
Reform, 431 U .S. 816, 862-63 (19 77) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)).
33

Smith , 431 U.S. at 826-28.

34

The bundle of sticks analogy clarifies the notion that the rights associated with ownership of property can
be “unbundled or disaggregated.” If the property is a bundle of sticks, the owner may give away one or
more sticks while retaining the balance of the bundle. The sticks may represent temporary interests such as
a particular usage or a term of years. As Joseph Singer explains it, “A particular piece of property may
have multiple owners of different sticks in the bundle of rights that comprises full ownership. When we are
asked to determine who owns a particular stick in the bundle, it may not help us to know who the “owner”
of the land is because ownership o f various sticks in the bund le may b e spre ad am ong se veral p eop le.”
Joseph W illiam Sing er, I N T R O DU C T IO N T O P ROPERTY 2-3 (2 001 ).
35

Id. at 828 & n.20.
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marry or enlist in the armed forces as a minor, among other decisions, and is presumed to
represent the child’s legal interests, retaining what amounts to a future interest in the child.36

The Supreme Court made it clear in Santosky that there is no room at the fact-finding
stage of a termination proceeding to weigh either the child’s independent interest or the
child’s relationship with a foster family against the rights of the natural parents in the care
custody and nurture of their child.37 The focus during fact-finding at a termination
proceeding is “emphatically” not on the child, or the other opportunities open to the child,
but only on whether “the natural parents are at fault” as the state alleges.38 There is no room
for the child’s perspective— even when there is lack of attachment to the natural parents or
positive attachment to current caregivers such as foster parents—until the court turns to
disposition.39 Nor can the court consider the child’s need for protection and safety outside
the context of parental fault.40
Similarly, lower courts have expressly held that while the best interests of the child
should be paramount in all proceedings to terminate parental rights, “a court may not base
36

Id. at 828 n.20. For examp le, a Michigan court recently refused to authorize surgery to implant
controversial hearing aids in two deaf boys in foster care over the objection of their mother, who the court
held re tained authority over elective surgery unless and until she loses custod y perm anently. Jon H all,
Mich. Judge Rules Deaf B oys N eedn’t U nde rgo Surg ery, B O S T ON G LOBE, Oct. 5, 2002, at A-3.
37

38

39

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745.
Id. at 759.
See Id. at 760

40

See Richa rd J. G elles & Ira Schwartz, Children and the Child Welfare System, 2 U. P A . J. C ONST . L. 95,
96 (199 9) (arguing tha t child we lfare de cision m aking is almost always “tilted in favor of the parents’ rights
at the expense of a child’s protectio n”); See also E L IZ AB E TH B ARTHOLET , N O B O D Y ’S C HILDREN : A BUSE
A N D N EGLECT , F OSTER C ARE D RIFT , AND THE A D O P TIO N A LTERNATIVE 113 (1999) (constitutional law
“gives adults fundamental rights to parent their children, while giving children no rights to be parented in a
nurturing way.”).
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termination of parental rights solely on the best interests of a child.”41 In order to terminate
parental rights, a court must first find that at least one statutory ground for termination
exists.42 Consistent with the discussion in Santosky, state laws governing termination
provide for a bifurcated analysis. First, the court must ask whether sufficient statutory
grounds have been shown for terminating the parent’s rights (with due consideration to the
parent’s constitutional rights). Only then may the court reach the second question: whether
termination of parental rights in fact serves the child’s best interest.43 If the statutory
grounds for termination have been well framed and the evidence that those grounds have
been met is clear and convincing, the child’s best interests will normally be served by
termination, particularly if the state has already identified a permanent or adoptive home for
the child.44

41

In re Welfare of M.H., 595 N.W.2d 223, 228 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing In re Welfare of J.K., 374
N.W .2d 4 63, 4 66 (Minn. Ct. A pp. 1 985 )) (emphasis add ed). See also David D . Meyer, Family Ties: Solving
the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ . L. R EV . 753, 785-86 (1999) [hereinafter
Family Ties].
42

M.H., 595 N.W.2d at 226.

43

S.L. v. C .A., 99 5 P.2d 1 7, 29 -30 (U tah Ct. A pp. 1 999 ) (W ilkins, J., concurring). See also Minn. Stat. §
260C.301 subd . 7 (Supp . 1999 ) (stating that best interests are considered after the court finds that at least
one of the statutory criteria for term inating parental rights has b een establishe d).
44

In limited instances in some states, ho wever, a court may use the b est interests inquiry to determine that a
sound reason exists not to terminate parental rights, even though the court has already determined that the
statutory grounds for termination have be en satisfied . See E.g., State v. Timperly, 750 P. 2d 1234, 1238
(Utah Ct. App. 1 988 ) (opining that the best interests of the child remains a princ ipal co nsideration in
termination p roceedings, and in this instance supp orts term ination). See Martin G uggenheim , The Effects of
Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care—An Empirical
Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM . L.Q. 121, 136 (1995) (urging judges to “inquire into the child’s best
interests and no t presume, m erely because statutory grounds exist to term inate parental rights, the child’s
best interests are served by doing so” particularly where no viable permanent placement is likely).
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B. Women’s Rights and Feminist Theory
When the abusive or neglectful parent who asserts a liberty interest and the
concomitant procedural protections is a mother, an additional array of troubling cultural
and theoretical issues emerges. These include the very definitions of “woman,”
“mother,” and themes of essentialism and anti-essentialism. Essentialism and antiessentialism refer to the notion that all women share, or do not share, a common
experience, and are, or are not, characterized by common attributes.45 Of course, the
terms “woman,” and “mother” are loaded with normative assumptions. To be a woman
is to be a current, past, or future mother, regardless of individual choice and reality.46 To
be a mother is normatively to be a “good” mother, so that the adjective need not even be
stated. A “mother” by default is the normative mother, a socially constructed image that
encapsulates many presumptions—especially those of a woman who is middle-class,
married, and a caretaker. In this view, only the unusual, deviant mother requires a
prefatory adjective: “single,” “working,” “welfare,” or “bad.” In reality, as some
feminist scholars have pointed out, an infinite variety of women and mothers exist.47
Proceedings to terminate parental rights offer an enormous variety of portraits of

45

M ARTHA C HAMALLAS , I N T R O DU C T IO N T O F EMINIST L EGA L T HEORY , 78 (2 d ed. 200 3). See also
K ATHARINE T. B A R TL ET T AN D A NGELA P. H AR RIS , G E N D ER A N D L AW : T HEORY , D O C T RIN E , C OMM ENTARY
100 7-9 (2 d ed. 199 8) (discussing the meanings of the term “essentialism”).
46

M ARTHA A L BE R TS O N F INEMAN , T HE N E U TE R ED M OTHER , THE S EXU AL F A M IL Y A N D O THER T WENTIETH
C E N TU R Y T RAGEDIES 38, 51 (199 5).
47

See generally J O A N W ILLIAMS , U NBENDING G ENDER : W H Y F A M IL Y A N D W ORK C O N F LIC T AN D W HAT TO
D O A BOUT I T (2000); Jane C . Murphy, Lega l Imag es of Motherhood: Con flicting Definitions from Welfare
“Reform,” Family, and Criminal Law, 83 C OR NE LL L. R EV . 688 (1998); M ARTHA A L BE R TS O N F INEMAN ,
T HE N E U TE R ED M OTHER , THE S EXU AL F A M IL Y A N D O THER T W E N T IE T H C E N TU R Y T RAGEDIES (1995); Carol
Sang er, Separating from Children, 96 C OLUMBIA L. R EV . 375 (1996).
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mothers. Women who have abused, neglected, or failed to protect the children may be
single, married, cohabiting or divorced.
Despite the ease with which we can locate these mothers in the real world,
feminist theory has “largely ignored ‘bad mothers’ and their implications for child
abuse.”48 This silence may reflect a defensive mechanism exercised by feminists in legal
practice either because they are reluctant to believe that their clients had “beaten, struck,
or kicked their children,” or because those realities are so difficult to “understand or
interpret.” Feminist scholars in turn skirted the issue because the facts did not mesh with
an early feminist meta-narrative of women as victims.49 Recently, however, feminist
scholars have also recognized that “women are not only victims … they are often guilty
themselves as agents who abuse children or fail to protect them.”50
The admission that women may abuse power and fail to protect their children
implicates two distinguishable categories of offense.51 In the first, the woman herself is
the agent of aggressive or passive acts that harm her children. In the second, the
woman’s liability stems from her failure to protect her children from abuse or neglect at
the hands of third party. In this second category, feminist theory suggests the importance
of clearly distinguishing the acts and omissions attributable to the mother from those of
the primary source of the harm (commonly the child’s father or the mother’s male
48

Marie Ashe & Naomi R . Cahn, Child A buse: A Prob lem for F eminist Theory, 2 T EX . J. W O M E N & L. 75,
76 (199 3).
49

Id. at 78, 79, 109.

50

Mary E. B ecker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Systems, Custody
Outcomes, and L iability for Acts of Others, 2 U. C H I. L. S CH . R OU ND TAB LE 13, 1 3 (1995 ). See also Barbara
Bennett W ood house, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 G EO . W ASH . L. R EV . 1247, 1248 (1999)
(discussing the emerging dialogue about child abuse between “feminists and child advocates”).
51

Becker, supra note 48, at 14.
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companion). Just as feminist scholars have highlighted the injustices wrought by the
traditional legal presumption that a man and his wife were a single legal unit for purposes
of spousal violence,52 so too must contemporary courts learn to distinguish when mothers
can and cannot be held accountable for the actions of the men in their lives. Women who
know that a particular person threatens their child’s safety and nevertheless fail to protect
the child from predictable or on-going harm, however, transform themselves into agents
of abuse. For example, the mother who refuses to leave a man who she learns is sexually
abusing her daughter is not a safe custodian for that child.
Analysis of the context in which events occur and individuals make decisions, a
major contribution of feminist theory to the understanding of family violence, has now
entered enlightened mainstream discussion,53 but is frequently overlooked in child
welfare decision-making. In context, victimization and social structures contribute to the
determination of which women regain their children from the child welfare system and
which women lose them forever.54 Extreme poverty in the face of a lack of services,
single parenthood and race all contribute to both initial intervention and ultimate removal
of children.55
52

See Michelle J. Anderson , Marital Immu nity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences: A New
Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 H ASTINGS L. J. 1465, 1477-85 (discussing evolution of the marital
rape exem ption); and.Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
Y ALE L. J. 2117 (199 6) (ad dressing the immunity fro m suit of husbands who beat their wives).
53

See generally Martha M inow, Wo rds and th e Door to the L and of Ch ang e: La w, La ngu age , and Family
Violence, 43 V A N D . L. R EV . 166 5, 16 82-8 3 (1990 ); Ashe & C ahn, supra note 46, at 109; Nicholson v.
W illiams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 163 -64 (E.D.N.Y . 2002).
54

See Naomi C ahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemma of Criminalization, 49 D E P A U L
L. R EV . 817, 822-826 (2000) (discussing the delicate balance in the criminal and civil legal systems of how
to protect both women and children without subordinating either group to the other).
55

See Sarah H. R amsey, Children in Poverty: Reconciling Children’s Interests with Child Protective
Services an d Welfare P olicies: A Respo nse to Ward D oran an d D orothy R oterts, 61 M D . L. R EV . 437, 44142 (2003)(discussing reports of abuse and neglect from caseworkers in the Temporary Assistance to Needy
Fam ilies Pro gram (“TA NF ”) based o n extreme p overty and home lessness); Lero y H. P elton, Comm entary,
Future C hild. Spring 1998 at 126-29 (criticizing the negative stereotypes of impoverished parents in a
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It is not my purpose here to contribute to the theoretical debate over the parameters
of what defines a “bad mother.” Instead, I distinguish between two groups of “bad” mothers.
The first group, which does not concern me here,56 consists of the small minority of mothers
who kill or physically assault their children or engage in other acts which the law labels
“aggravated circumstances,” eliminating the need for efforts to reunite the surviving
members of the family under the express provisions of ASFA.57 Although the mothers who
engage in such aggravated behavior can be viewed as bad, indifferent, victims, or all three,
depending on the worldview of the observer, from the perspective of the child, ASFA
correctly puts the child’s need for safety and stability ahead of the mother’s needs and rights.
The second group of mothers, the group upon which I focus my discussion, consists
of women whose children dominate the foster care population. These mothers are labeled
“neglectful” for any number of reasons, including substance abuse, poverty, homelessness,
and so forth.58 In some instances, neglect that poses a serious physical and/or psychological
threat to the child cannot easily be addressed through services.59 In other cases, if services
public child welfare system which is “a coercive apparatus wrapped in a helping orientation.”) and sources
cited in footnote 61 infra.
56

Presuming for purposes of this discussion that standards of proof are met and adequate procedural
protections have been provided, I will assume that the mother who allegedly drowned, knifed or scalded her
child intentionally actually did so. The theoretical problems raised by such cases are distinguishable from
those raised by the ne glect cases. M oreo ver, the issu es of physical safety and the child’s ability to trust his
or her caretaker are starkly framed in such abuse cases. G OLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4 ; R IC H A R D J.
G ELLES , T HE B OO K OF D AV ID : H O W P RESERVING F AMILIES C A N C OST C HILDREN ’S L IVES (1996).
57

42 U.S.C.A. § 671 (a) (15) (D) (i) (West 2003) (stating that aggravated circumstances, which shall be
defined by state law, include but are not limited to “abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual
abuse”).
58

See Cynthia R. M abry, Second Chances: Insuring that Poor Families Remain Intact by Minimizing
Soc ioeco nom ic Ra mifica tions o f Pov erty, 10 2 W . V A . L. R EV . 607 , 612 -14, 6 16-2 4 (2000 ). See generally
Symp osium , The Rights of Parents With Children in Foster Care: Removals from Economic Hardship and
the Predictive Power of Race, 6 N.Y. C IT Y L. R EV . 115 (2003) (experts discussing removals of children
from poor parents of color because of child neglect arising from poverty).
59

See Mab ry, supra note 58 at 610-11 (20 00).
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were available and provided in timely fashion, neither the initial removal of the child from
the home nor the eventual termination of parental rights would likely prove necessary.60
The label of neglectful parent is skewed by class, race, culture and ethnicity from the
point of reporting and investigation through removal and termination.61 To the extent that
child welfare agencies or courts view some mothers as “bad” or neglectful based on nothing
more than cultural difference or poverty, such failure to conform to an idealized notion of
family life does not constitute a legitimate basis for removing a child. One commentator,
discussing persistent complaints about the lack of funding for preventive services, concluded
“[a]lthough in theory children are not removed from their parents because of poverty … this
distinction cannot be maintained.”62 For example, Adriana Recodo, “the victim of an
abusive domestic relationship . . . had no income, no place to live and no transportation.
When she sought help from a social worker, she received a referral to a psychologist and her
son entered foster care. Recodo was studying for her G.E.D., and seeking employment. She
could not find stable housing, but the state did not provide her with housing assistance. Her
parental rights were terminated due to “chronic instability” in her employment and
60

Id. at 626-49 (surveying pro grams and services that help parents either retain or regain custody of their
children).
61

See generally D O R O T HY R OBERTS , S H A T TE R ED B O N D S : T HE C OLOR O F C H IL D W ELFARE (2002)
(discussing the influence of race permeating America’s child welfare system); To nya L. B rito, The
Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U .K AN . L. R EV . 229 (2000) (evaluating the intersection and overlap of
family law a nd we lfare law); Catherine J. R oss and N aom i R. Ca hn, Sub sidy for Caretaking in Families:
Lesson s from F oster Care, 8 AM . U.J. G ENDER S O C . P O L’Y & L. 55, 70 (2000 ) (investigating the
socio econom ic assum ptions unde rlying the fed eralization of foster care). See also Lero y H. P elton, Child
Abu se and Neglect: The M yth of Classlessn ess, 48(4) A MER . J. O RTHOPSYCHIAT . 608 (1978) (arguing that a
relationship exists betwe en po verty, child abuse and neglect that shou ld not be igno red); E L IZ AB E TH
B ARTHOLET , N O B O D Y ’S C HILDREN : A B U S E A N D N EGLECT , F OSTER D RIFT , AND THE A D O P TIO N
A LTERNATIVE (1999) (adm itting that race and class discrimination does influence state intervention in the
family and that coercive intervention disparately impacts poor and minority race parents).
62

Ram sey, supra note 5 5, at 44 5; and Diane J. English, The Extent an d Consequ ences of C hild
Ma ltreatm ent, F uture Child., Spring 1998, at 49-51 (victims of neglect are the lowest child welfare agency
priority and “receive few services”).
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housing.63 The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the termination,64 but a pointed dissent
put Recodo’s case in the context of other termination cases that had reached the state’s
highest court, concluding that “the State’s modus operandi appears to be to go into the
homes of handicapped, powerless and usually very poor parents, remove their children …
and put the children into the home of substitute parents who are more affluent than the
natural parents and more pleasing to social service agents than the natural parents.”65
Yet the relationship between poverty and entrance into foster care should not be
surprising. It is inseparable from our society’s public expectations and legal norms
concerning the privatization of caretaking.66 The denial of collective responsibility for
caretaking in favor of norms that emphasize autonomy and self-reliance, as Martha Fineman
has argued, deprives caretakers of the social, financial and government support that many of
them desperately need.67 The institution of foster care itself may be understood as a
substitution of one private caretaking unit for another, albeit with a small government
subsidy (and the oversight that accompanies subsidy in our system).68 The children of
neglectful parents would benefit most from a more sensitive filtering system, in which

63

64

65

Recodo v. State, 930 P .2d 1128 , 1133 (Ne v. 1997).
Id.
Id., at 1136 (Springer, J., dissenting).
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Martha F inema n, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8
A M . U.J. G ENDER S O C . P O L’Y & L. 13 , 15 (1 999 ) [hereinafter Finema n, Foundational Myths]; Martha
Finem an, The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9 STAN . L. & P O L’Y R EV . 89, 90-91
(1998) [hereinafter Finema n, Inevitability].
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See Finem an, Foundational Myths, supra note 6 6, at 19 -20; Finema n, Inevitability, supra note 59, at 9091.
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See Ross & C ahn, supra note 61, at 57-58.
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neglect that does not result in serious harm or danger would trigger benefits in the form of
services, rather than potentially unwarranted removal.69
It is likely that a regime in which the child’s rights were given weight would result in
fewer instances of children being removed from borderline domestic situations. In an
attempt to articulate current attitudes towards children’s rights, the following section
examines the child’s independent interests within the child welfare system.

69

See genera lly, Gold stein et al., supra note 4 (arguing for minimum state intervention into families and use
of the “least detrimental alternative” which may include maintenance of the status quo or providing
supportive assistance).
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C. Children’s Rights
Young children are not autonomous persons. The law recognizes that children need
adults to nurture and supervise them.70 The parental rights doctrine is premised in part on
this notion, and the child welfare system is in turn based upon the view that if the biological
parents prove unfit for the job of raising their children, the state has a compelling interest in
replacing the failed parent with one who is up to the challenge. The state’s interest in the
healthy development of its youngest citizens is deemed to allow the state to substitute itself
and its representatives to be spokespersons for the children in lieu of unfit biological parents.
Just as feminists have argued that the woman and man in a marital unit should not be
collapsed into one legal and cultural identity, so too children’s rights advocates emphasize
the importance of being able to distinguish when a child’s interests converge with that of the
parent, and when it is imperative to recognize that the needs or interests of parent and child
substantially diverge.71 In the context of the child welfare system, it may be inappropriate to
assume that the child’s needs are fully represented by the parent’s legal claims. At the same
time, it oversimplifies matters to presume that the interests of a child in foster care are
irretrievably at odds with those of her parents. Instead, to do justice to the potentially
competing claims of mothers and children in the child welfare system, we need to struggle to
find a way to hear the voice of the individual child.72 While the voices of children of various
70

Barbara Bennett Wood house, Ha tching the Egg: A Child-Centered P erspe ctive on Paren ts’ Rights, 14
C A R D O ZO L. R EV . 174 7, 18 09-1 1 (1993 ); Appell, supra note 10, at 701-703.
71

In other contexts, I have argued that children should have the right to counsel in civil litigation where
their parents do not adeq uately speak for them, and should have the right to access inform ation essential to
their exe rcise of constitutio nal rights fro m public sources even o ver their parents’ objections. See Ross, An
Emerging Right, supra note 1 1, at 22 5-26 . See Ross, Vulnerability to Voice, supra note 11, at 1572-74. On
the other hand, I have argued that parents have the right to monitor their children’s access to controversial
material, and that children need their parents’ advice in the c ontext of the juvenile justice system . See Ross,
Anything Goes, supra note 1 5, at 47 6-87 . See Catherine J. Ross, Implementing Constitutional Rights for
Juveniles: The Parent-Child Privilege in Context, 14 STAN . L. & P O L’Y R EV . 85, 107-114 (2003).
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ages may be treated differently because the balance of dependency and autonomy shifts
during the process of maturation,73 even very young children may have ways of
communicating about their needs.
However, once the law has assigned the designation of “parent” to a particular adult,
parental rights doctrine as interpreted by Santosky dictates that the child has no voice
separate from the parent in court until grounds for termination are established.74 Because of
the importance of parental rights doctrine, courts will not normally substitute the child’s best
interest for an analysis of parental fault. Courts frequently decline weigh the unique
circumstances of a child’s life, even where they suggest that the child’s emotional wellbeing would be served by taking into consideration factors other than parental fault, such as
the child’s attachment to caretakers.75
This was the issue in the case of “Baby Jessica” DeBoer, who was wrongfully
adopted at the age of 17 days, even though her father’s rights had not been terminated. She
was two years old and had known no parents other than her adoptive mother and father
when Justice Stevens refused to stay the lower court’s order returning her to her natural
parents. Justice Stevens explained that no law “authorizes unrelated persons to retain
custody of a child whose natural parents have not been found to be unfit, simply because
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See generally, Katherine H unt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the Rights of
Children, 68 T E M P. L. R EV . 1585 (1995) (arguing that children should not be excluded from the rhetoric of
rights and that children should be empo wered to voice their preferences about custody in divorce cases).
73

74

75

Ross, An Emerging Right, supra note 1 1, at 24 2-50 .
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745.
See M eyer, Fam ily Ties, supra note 41, at 778-92 (surveying cases).
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they may be better able to provide for her.”76 In the similar and equally controversial case of
“Baby Richard,” the father only discovered that Richard was alive 57 days after the birth,
well after Richard had been adopted. Ruling that the father's rights had been terminated
improperly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that courts may not consider the best interests of
the child before determining, as a threshold matter, that parental rights should be terminated.
If they could, the court opined, “few parents would be secure in the custody of their own
children.”77 The corollary of this principle is that every child should be secure in her
parents’ custody. Thus the issue in both cases, decided in the context of private adoption
rather than of the child welfare system, was a profound disagreement between advocates for
the children and the birth fathers78 over whether to define “parents” based on biology or on
the child’s emotional experience.
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DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1993)(Stevens, Circuit Justice) (denying application for a stay
by Jessica’s ad optive parents).
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In re Petition of D oe, 638 N .E.2d 18 1, 18 3 (Ill. 19 94), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (199 4).
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For a discussion of Richard’s perspective based on his 3-year relationship with his adoptive parents see
Go ldstein et al., supra note 4 at 51-61.
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D. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
The pendulum of child welfare reform has repeatedly swung between efforts to
preserve troubled families at virtually all costs and a passion to rescue every child in need.
At the height of a prevailing but oversimplified interpretation of family preservation in the
mid-1990’s, about half–a-million children were in foster care because they had been
“rescued” and were waiting for their parents to be rehabilitated so that they could return
home. In many of these situations, the facts made clear that they were unlikely ever to rejoin
their parents. Although foster care was designed as a temporary expedient and was
administered as if it were in fact temporary, increasing numbers of children were spending
three years or more in foster care, many of them in a series of homes. This phenomenon
became known as “foster care drift.”79 About one-third of the children in foster care would
never return home.80 Instead, many of these children grew up in a series of foster homes and
institutions, languishing for years in a child welfare system that moved at a “glacial pace.”81
At the same time, publicity focused awareness on several egregious cases of children who
had been returned to their families, only to die at the hands of a parent.82
Eventually, the increasingly widespread perception that the foster care system was
out of control and hurting children led to a congressional search for uniform solutions based
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H.R. R EP . N O . 105 -77, at 8 (19 97), reprin ted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2740;LaShawn v. Dixon, 762
F. Supp. 959, 960 (D.D.C. 199 1).
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Do nald D uque tte & M ark H ardin, Guidelines for Public Policy and State Legislation Governing
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Robert M . Gordon, Drifting Th rough B yzan tium: The Promise and Failure of the Adop tion a nd S afe
Families Act of 1997, 83 M IN N . L. R EV . 637, 649 (19 99).
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Id. at 647.
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on the child’s need for safety, nurturance and permanency.83 ASFA, enacted with
overwhelming bipartisan support, proclaimed “two basic goals: [p]reventing children from
being returned to unsafe homes, and finding safe and loving and permanent homes for
children who cannot be reunited with their families.”84
Like other child welfare reform efforts since the 1970’s, ASFA drew heavily on the
child development principles set forth in the influential work of Joseph Goldstein, Albert
Solnit, and Anna Freud.85 These principles include consideration of (1) the child’s need for
parental continuity—an adult who serves as the child’s “psychological parent,” (2) the
importance of instilling in the child the feeling of being safe, protected and loved, and (3) the
child’s compressed sense of time and the concomitant urgency of resolution.86 Above all, the
leading interpreters of ASFA called on those charged with applying the law to look at the
foster care system “through the eyes of the child.”87
83

For ASFA’s legislative history and the core provisions that history produced,see Rachel Venier, Parental
Rights and the Best Interests of the Child: Implications of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 on
Do mestic Violence Victim s’ Rights, 8 AM . U.J. G ENDER S O C . P O L’Y & L. 51 7, 52 3-29 (2000); Steph anie Jill
Gendell, In Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First 3 Years of the Adoption and Safe Families Act
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84
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ASFA’s proponents urged careful consideration of the child’s perspective because
they were aware that the interests of parents and children do not always mesh.88 Several
members of Congress expressly stated that the balance of children’s and parents’ rights had
to shift under ASFA.89 As one commentator has noted, putting children first is “often
‘difficult and painful.’ It is difficult because adults do not have children’s needs and cannot
easily see what they are. It is painful because what is good for children may be unfair to
adults.”90 Congress made clear that where it was not possible to be equally “fair” to children
and their parents, ASFA requires courts to elevate the interests of the child over those of the
parent.
The effort to focus on children’s needs was embodied in the Act’s key provision,
providing that in order to retain federal funding, the state “shall” move to terminate parental
rights with the goal of adoption or another form of permanent placement in two categories of
cases: (1) cases where it is apparent early on that the child cannot safely return home
because of “aggravated circumstances,” such as torture or a felony assault; and (2) all cases
involving children who “have been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for 15
of the most recent 22 months” (the “15/22 months rule”).91 Generally, the aggravated
Id. at VII-5. See also Brown v. Division of Family Services, 803 A.2d 948, 954 (Del. 2002) (discussing
these guidelines).
88
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Go rdon, supra note 81, at 657.

91
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circumstances cases are not complex in terms of either law or morality. The facts of those
cases are so heinous that line-drawing should not prove difficult. In cases involving
“aggravated circumstances” the parent has already put the child’s life at risk. In contrast, the
cases in the second group are not so straightforward. With the passage of time, termination
becomes more and more likely, and the needs all children have for stability and permanence
are pitted directly against the claims of their parents. In many, or even most instances,
ASFA’s reforms promote the actual needs of the individual child. Unfortunately, as I will
demonstrate in Section III, the complexities of child welfare cases are not always amenable
to such an easy categorical fix. As a result, if states consistently apply the statute as written,
ASFA may unwittingly place the claims of the state in conflict with the demonstrable needs
of at least some fraction of children.92
In addition to enunciating the “15/22 months” legal rule, the Act imposes specific
accelerated time lines for court proceedings designed to guarantee the child a permanent
placement, whether with the natural parents or somewhere else. ASFA thus requires that a
court conduct a permanency hearing “no later than 12 months after the date the child is
considered to have entered foster care.”93 It is this section of ASFA that squarely raises the
own case plan “deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home.” Id.
92

ASF A establishes a presumptio n that, after 1 5 mo nths have passed, all children are b etter off if their
parental rights are terminated. Because this presumption is rebuttable only when one of the three statutory
exceptions listed supra note 91 apply, the ASFA presump tion may pit the claims of the state against the
dem onstrable needs o f some children. Early repo rts indicate that ma ny states an d courts are failing to
com ply with the 15/2 2 mo nths req uirement. See U.S. G EN . A CCOUNTING O FFICE , F OSTER C ARE : R E C EN T
L E G IS LA T IO N H ELPS S TATES F O C U S O N F IN D IN G P ERMANEN T H OMES FOR C HILDREN , B UT L O N G -S T A N D IN G
B ARRIERS R EM AIN , GAO -02-585, 23-31 (June 20 02).
93

42 U.S.C.A. § 675 (5)(C) (W est 2003). This date may be longer than 12 months after the child was
removed from the home. ASFA considers a child to have entered foster care on the earlier of “the date of
the first judicial finding that the child has b een subjec t to child abuse or neglect” or “the date that is 60 days
after the date on which the child is removed from the home.” 42 U .S.C.A § 675 (5)(F) (W est 2003).
Therefore, the permanency hearing might not occur until fourteen months after the child actually left the
parents’ home, even assuming that court calendars allow the hearings to be conducted in timely fashion.
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question raised in Santosky and left unanswered by the Supreme Court for thirty-five years:
is the passage of time sufficient to establish a level of parental “fault” that satisfies the due
process clause for the purposes of irrevocably terminating a mother’s right to her child?
The remaining sections of this article consider the interplay between the time line
and the respective rights of parents and children – rights that can either be mutually
reinforcing, or may stand in direct conflict.
II. The Mere Passage of Time
Federal law creates an implicit presumption that a parent who allows a child to
linger in foster care for 15 months is unfit. By virtue of this assumption, in an effort to
place the child’s presumptive interests front and center, the Act sidestepped the essential
legal question of how the state would establish legally sustainable grounds for
termination in light of the court’s obligation to consider the rights of the parent in their
child.
By the end of 1999, every state and the District of Columbia had amended local
statutes in an effort to comply generally with ASFA.94 Illinois reconciled the standard of
“unfitness” with the 15/22 months rule by revising its statutes to provide, in part, that a
parent may be found unfit if, pursuant to a court order, “a child has been in foster care for
15 months out of any 22 month period.”95 In In re H.G., the only reported case to date
considering the due process implications of the 15/22 months rule, the Illinois Supreme
Court overturned the section of the state statute (“Section 1 (D)(m-1) of the Adoption
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U.S. G EN . A CCOUNTING O FFICE , S TATES ’ E A R LY E XPERIENCES I MPLEMENTING THE A D O P TIO N
F AMILIES A CT GAO / HEH S-00-1 6 (Dec. 22, 19 99).
95

750 ILC S 50/1(D)(m -1) (West 1998 ).
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Act”) that created this new ground of parental unfitness based on the length of time a
child has remained in foster care.96
As summarized by the court, the facts of the case are not atypical.97 Illinois
removed H.G. from her mother’s custody in March of 1996 because of neglect. The state
alleged that the mother had violated a protective order by allowing H.G. to see her father,
and had grabbed H.G.’s arm on two occasions, causing it to dislocate.98 H.G. entered
foster care. Nine months later, in December of 1996, the court placed H.G. in the legal
custody of the state and ordered the mother to participate in a variety of services,
including obtaining appropriate housing, participating in therapy, and completing

96

In re H.G., 757 N .E.2d 864, 86 5 (Ill. 2001). Although the court stated that the Illinois Adoption Act went
a step further than ASFA, it is hard to distinguish the Illinois language from the requirements of ASFA,
since ASFA imposes a duty on the state to initiate termination proceedings if the child has been in foster
care fo r 15 of the last 2 2 mo nths, regardless of whe ther any other grounds for termination exist.
Furthermore, the Illinois act provided defenses to termination that ASFA failed to provide. For example, the
Illinois statute built in some judicial discretion, allowing the parent to “prove by a prepond erance of the
evidence that it is more likely than not that it will be in the best interests of the child to be returned to the
parent within 6 months of the date on which a petition for termination of parental rights is filed.” 750 ILCS
50/1 (D)(m-1) (W est 1998). In other word s, a parent who was alm ost in co mpliance and moving forward in
a treatment plan could apparently stop the clock and gain a few extra months, if doing so would serve the
child’s b est interests.
South Carolina has enacted a similar statute which adds a ground fo r termination where a child “has been in
foster care under the responsibility of the State for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months” and
termination is in the best interest of the child. S.C. C ODE A N N . § 20-7-1572 (W est 2003).
97

The briefs submitted to the Illinois Supreme Court offer different versions of the facts, which were never
litigated. The summary of the facts in the opinion closely resembles the facts as stated by attorneys for the
mother. Brief of Respo ndent-Appellee, E.W ., Supreme Court of Illinois (No . JAK 96-0 41). The state’s
rendition of the facts predictably tells a more negative story about the mother who, the state alleges, had
failed to protect two older daughters from sexual abuse at the hands of her lover, failed to provide necessary
follow-up for H.G. after she had heart surgery, and visited H.G. only sporadically while she was in foster
care. B rief of Petitioner-App ellant, Peop le of the S tate of Illino is. Attorneys who were appo inted to
represent the children in a co mpa nion case made clear tha t the children whose p lacem ent was at issue in
that matter had no meaningful relationship with their mother since they had entered foster care at the ages
of eight d ays and three and one-half m onths, re spectively. Brief and Argument of M inors-A ppe llants in
Charles S. and Jo shua S . v. Heniak (N os. 91 J 04221 and 9 2 J 2038 0). (All briefs cited here are on file with
the author).
98

In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d at 867.
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parenting classes.99 The record offers no indication of the relationship between the
mother’s housing and the allegations of neglect, nor does it indicate what services, if any,
the state offered the mother in any of these three areas.100
In August 1998, 20 months after the trial court’s dispositional order and 29
months (or two and a half years) after H.G. was removed from her home, the state filed a
petition for termination of the mother’s rights. The petition alleged that the mother was
unfit under section 1(D)(m-1) of the Illinois Adoption Act because she had failed either
to make “reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for removal”

99

Id. The Illinois statute fleshed out one of the most important exemptions to the mandatory filing
provisions in ASFA. Under ASFA, the 15/22 months rule does not apply in cases where the state has not
met its service and treatment obligations to the natural parents. ASFA provides that the state does not need
to file a term ination p etition based on the 15/2 2 mo nth rule where “the state has not provid ed to the family
of the child, consistent with the time period in the state case plan, such services as the state deems
necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home” – the undefined “reasonable efforts” that had
plagued enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. Ado ption Assistance and
Child W elfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272 § 101 (a)(1) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
For critiques of the reasonable e fforts req uirement as ap plied, see Gelles, supra note 56 at 95-113, 131 and
Cristine H. K im, Note, Putting Reason Back Into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Child Abuse and
Neglect Cases, 1999 U. I LL. L. R EV . 287, 296-309 (1999).
100

The Illinois statute specified, however, that the “15 month time limit is tolled during any period for
which there is a court find ing that the appointed custod ian or guardian [i.e., the fo ster care system and its
agents] failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child with his or her family.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m1) (West 1998). This standard is much more favorable to the family than the language of the federal statute.
Under the language of ASFA, a child welfare system could drag its feet, offer inadequate services, and then
fully comply shortly before the terminatio n hearing, and prevail. Under the Illinois law, the parent would
arguably get credit for every month during which she did not receive adequate services. Given the poor
track re cord of many child welfare agenc ies around the cou ntry in pro viding services, this app roach wou ld
likely undermine AS FA’s goal of “fast track” perm anency planning. See, e.g., Mabry, supra note 58, at
617 -618 , 626 -630 , 646 (discussing the risk that pa rental righ ts may be terminated simply b ecause the fam ily
is poo r and no services ha ve be en provided). T he Illinois approach does, how ever, o ffer som e pro tection to
parents and to children who wo uld be better off remaining with their pa rents. Perhap s equally impo rtant, it
may p rovid e an incentive for agencies to im prove the re sponsiveness of their service s. On the othe r hand , it
may be impossible for parents to pursue aggressively claims that they have received inadequate services
because the same casew orker and supervisor w ho they are claiming d enied them services m ay con tinue to
hold decision-making power in their case. But services, or the lack thereof, were not the focus of the
appellate decision in H.G.’s case.
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or to make reasonable progress toward reunification. Trial was originally scheduled for
March, 1999, but seven months of continuances, some initiated by the state, followed.101
In October 1999, 14 months after the state filed its petition for termination, 34
months after the original disposition order, and 43 months after H.G. entered the foster
care system, the state filed an amended petition to terminate parental rights, this time
adding an allegation that the mother was unfit because H.G. had been in foster care for 15
out of the preceding 22 months. Another series of continuances postponed the trial date
to the end of January 2000. By its own terms, ASFA (as Illinois implemented it) failed
H.G. dismally. When the termination hearing finally began, she had been in foster care
for more than three years, more than the average length of time that children spent in
foster care before ASFA became law.102
H.G.’s mother challenged Section 1(D)(m-1) on the grounds that it violated her
due process and equal protection rights because it is “not narrowly tailored to achieve its
manifest purpose, improperly shifts the burden of proof to a respondent parent, and
improperly invites consideration of best interest issues at the fitness portion of a
101

Id. at 867-70 It is often unclear when the 22 month period begins to run under ASFA, even though the
statute provides that “[a] child shall be considered to have entered foster care on the earlier of (i) the date of
the first judicial finding that the child has b een subjec ted to abuse or neglect; or (ii) the d ate that is 60 days
after the d ate on which the child is remo ved from the hom e.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 67 5 (5) (F). In re H.G.
illustrates the problem. The Illinois courts stated that the 15-month time frame of section 1(D)(m-1) became
app licable to the ca se only after the final continuance. Id. at 872 (asserting that “[n]ine of the 15 months
covered by the state’s allegation of unfitness under se ction 1 (D)(m-1) were directly attributab le to
continuances which were necessary to b ring the case to trial.”). See also Riverside C o. Dep’t of P ublic
Soc ial Services v. R .M., 134 Cal. R ptr. 2d 187 (2003) (discussing co nfusion over when the clock be gins to
run).
102

The length of time that H.G. drifted in foster care was not at issue in the case. From the small sample that
I have seen in my own consulting, and from the few reported cases, such postponements seem to continue
to occur with great frequency. The Government Accounting Office reports that most states do not collect
data on their compliance with the 15/22 month provision. The nine states that responded to a GA O inquiry
about the impact of the 15/22 month rule reported that “the number of children exempted from the
provision greatly exceeded the number of children to whom it was applied.” U.S. G EN . A C C O U N TIN G
O FFICE , F OSTER C ARE : R ECENT L E G IS LA T IO N H ELPS S TATES F O C U S O N F IN D IN G P ERMANEN T H O M E S FO R
C HILDREN , B UT L O N G -S TANDING B ARRIERS R EM AIN , GAO -02-585, 26-27 (June 20 02).
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termination hearing,” in violation of the holding in Santosky.103 The trial court granted
the mother’s motion on all three grounds, stating “[t]he problem is inherent in that this
particular statute, unlike all of the other provisions for finding unfitness, relates not to
conduct of a parent or an internal flaw of character or behavior or mental illness or
physical infirmity, but rather the mere passage of time.”104 The Illinois Supreme Court
expressly rejected the state’s argument that “a fit parent does not allow his or her child to
languish in foster care for fifteen months.”105 The court correctly pointed out that the
case before it “aptly illustrate[s]” that, “in many cases, the length of a child’s stay in
foster care has nothing to do with the parent’s ability or inability to safely care for the
child but, instead, is due to circumstances beyond the parent’s control.”106 It continued,
[b]ecause there will be many cases in which children remain in foster
care for the statutory period even when their parents can properly care for
them ... the presumption contained in section 1(D)(m-1) is not a narrowly
tailored means of identifying parents who pose a danger to their children’s
health or safety.107
In summary, the court stated, “[w]e decline to recognize that the State has a
compelling interest in removing children from foster care in an expeditious fashion when
that removal is achieved in an unconstitutional manner.”108
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In re H .G., 757 N.E.2d at 868, 873.
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Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
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Id. at 871.
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Id. at 872. At a subsequent hearing, the judge refused to return H.G . to her m other on the ground that it
would not be in her best interest even though he fo und that she co uld be safely ca red fo r in her m other’s
hom e. Id. at 869.
107

Id. at 873.

108

Id. at 874.
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Clarity about legal standards and zealous protection of procedural rights is
particularly important in termination cases because a profound imbalance of power
permeates the relationship between a mother and the state. This imbalance not only
dominates the day-to-day dealings of the parties, it also allows the state to play a large role
in crafting the record that a court ultimately reviews in most, if not all, cases. As the
Supreme Court observed in Santosky, in most termination proceedings, because “the child is
already in agency custody, the State even has the power to shape the historical events that
form the basis for termination,” thus increasing the risk of erroneous fact-finding.109
If the agency drags its feet, and fails to provide the parent with needed resources and
support, fifteen months are likely to be consumed without any discernable change in the
parent’s circumstances. In addition, while the mother often lacks legal representation during
much, if not all of the process, the child welfare agency is represented by counsel from the
inception of its relationship with the mother. Because she lacks legal representation, the
mother may be intimidated, inarticulate or confused.110 Consequently, she may “consent” to
a course of action from which it is hard to extricate herself (such as “voluntary” placement
under threat of coerced removal of her children).111 Equally important, caseworkers keep
written records of the mother’s attitude, behavior and compliance, all of which can be
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Santosky , 455 U.S.at 763, 763 n.13.
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Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 47 (1981 ) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“By intimidation,
inarticulateness or confusion, a parent can lose forever all contact and involvement with his or her
offspring.”).
111

Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 15 3, 215 (E.D .N.Y. 2002 ). Defendants conceded that many
child welfare matters evade court review “because mothers will usually agree to attend whatever services
[the agency] demands once their children have been in foster care for a few days.” Id. For this reason, the
federal guidelines for implementing ASFA recommend that “biological parents or legal guardians” receive
legal representation in jud icial proceed ings, “even when the o ut of home p lacement o riginates as a
voluntary plac ement.” Duque tte & H ardin, supra note 80, at VII-6.
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introduced as evidence at a termination hearing. Because the caseworker has significant
leeway to describe the mother as he or she sees fit in those records, the caseworker wields
enormous power. In addition, it may prove difficult or impossible to correct even factual
errors in the record.112 As one federal judge concluded, “the damage to constitutional rights
is accomplished in the many months preceding the opportunity for final judicial
disposition.”113
Despite the clear risks that accumulate with the passage of time, less than one-third
of all states have even attempted to craft a statutory rationale for terminating parental rights
(absent other statutory grounds for termination) after a child has been in foster care for 15 of
the preceding 22 months.114 The efforts of those states that have tackled the drafting
problem tend to fall into one of three approaches: (1) the prima facie case; (2) the rebuttable
legal presumption or “res ipse loquitur” case115; and (3) the “predictive” approach, based on
evaluations of future parental capacity and behavior.
The first approach (the “prima facie case”), exemplified by the statute overturned in
Illinois and a similar (as-yet untested) provision in South Carolina,116 makes the placement
112

Lassiter, 452 U .S. at 46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[E]rrors of fact . . . in the State’s case may go
unchallenged and uncorrected.”).
113

Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
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In many states, the reference to 1 5/22 months (or, in so me instances, a shorter perio d) is found only in
the section on definitions, or in the section on when a termination petition should be filed, and the passage
of time is not addre ssed in the portion of the code that spells out the grounds for terminating parental rights.
A handful of states do not ap pear to have incorporated any reference in their statute to the 15/22 month
period set forth in ASFA. T hese include Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, North Dako ta, South Dakota, and
Vermo nt. The material discussed in the text accompanying footnotes 114 to 117, 120 and 126-12 7 are
indebted to research performed by Johanna L. Ferraro (University of Pennsylvania Law School Class of
2005) at The Field Center during the summer of 2002.
115

Res ipse loquitur, the thing speaks for itself, “[is a] doctrine providing that, in some circumstances, the
mere fact of an accid ent’s occurrence raises an inference of negligence so as to establish a prim a facie
case.” B LACK’S L A W D ICTIONARY 1311 (7 th ed. 1999).
116

S.C. C ODE A N N . § 20 -7-15 72 (8) (1998 )(stating tha t the court may order term ination o f parental rights
upon a finding that the “child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for fifteen of the
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of a child in foster care for 15 out of 22 months prima facie proof of parental unfitness and
thus an independent ground for termination. The surface advantage of this approach is
obvious. It enables lawmakers and judges to circumvent the logjam at the heart of ASFA
which is created by the conflict between two legal principles: placing the child’s best
interests first, on the one hand, and the constitutional imperative not to disrupt the parentchild relationship unless strict legal standards have been satisfied, on the other.
The second approach (which I call the “res ipse loquitur” approach) is similar, but
allows some flexibility. Under this regime, if a child has been in foster care for 15 of the
preceding 22 months, the law establishes a presumption that the best interests of the child
will be served by termination of parental rights.117 This resembles the approach in tort law
that under certain conditions, if one party has been injured (the child) then another party (the
parent) must have been negligent, and thus blameworthy. The presumption is that remaining
in foster care for 15 out of 22 months causes injury to the child and this serves as evidence
of unfitness, because a fit parent would have regained custody of the child in that period of
time. Whatever the initial harm to the child may have been, this formulation makes the
child’s continuing presence in foster care an on-going harm attributable to the parent rather
than to the state.118 The res ipse loquitur approach makes a useful conceptual contribution.
It helps to focus the court’s attention on the harms the child has experienced both in the
most recent twenty-two months”).
117

M O N T . C ODE A N N . § 41 -3-60 4 (1) (2001). See also I D A H O C O D E § 16-1623 (i) (2003) (stating that the
state shall initiate termination p roceedings based on this “rebu ttable p resum ption” when a child has be en in
the departm ent’s custo dy and in out-of-home plac ement for 15 out of the preced ing 22 months).
118

In many instances it is unrea sonable to blame the parent for the pe rsistence of the co nditions that led to
the child’s initial removal. Examples include situations in which services are provided to children only on
the condition that those children not remain in the home. See M A R Y G ILB ER TI & R HODA S CHULZINGER ,
R ELINQUISHING C U S T OD Y : T HE T RAGIC R ESULT O F F A IL UR E TO M EET C HILDREN ’S M EN TAL H EALTH
N E E DS , (Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, March 2 000).
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parent’s custody and as a consequence of the child’s prolonged stay in foster care. The shift
in emphasis from the rights of the parent to the needs of the child is exactly what ASFA
intended.
But even though the res ipse loquitur presumption is expressly or implicitly
rebuttable, it shares some of the infirmities found in the Illinois law at issue in H.G. Once
the plaintiff (the child, represented by the state) has established by circumstantial evidence
that reasonable persons could conclude that the injury was caused by parental negligence,
the parents’ defense relies on a strong showing of an alternative explanation, which the
parents may not be able to establish.119
The third, and in my view most promising, approach requires that the court predict
the likelihood that the parent will be a fit or unfit parent for this child in the near future. The
statutes that adopt a predictive approach require the court to evaluate both the extent to
which the state has provided the parent with rehabilitative programs and other opportunities
to meet the state’s demands, and the parent’s efforts to address the state’s concerns while the
child has been in foster care. In Connecticut, for example, the statute expressly provides a
ground for termination where the child has been in the custody of the state for 15 of the 22
preceding months and
the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate
the return of the child to the parent . . . and has failed to achieve such degree
of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a
reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent
could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.120
119

In W . P AGE K EETON ET AL., P R O S SE R AN D K E E TO N O N T ORTS §40 (5 th ed. 1984) (explaining that under
the res ipse loquitur doctrine, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on the prepond erance of the
circumstantial evidence).
120

C O N N . G EN . S TAT . § 17a-112 (j) (3)(B)(ii) (2003). The statute reins in judicial discretion by requiring
that in all cases where parents oppose termination of their rights, the trial court shall make written findings
regarding seven factors including: (1) the services offered to the parent; (2) the extent to which the state and
the parents fulfilled the terms of any applicable c ourt order;(3) the child’s significant emotional ties with
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This standard allows the court to take the child’s sense of the passage of time into account,
and to weigh it heavily against the parent’s plea for more time to attempt rehabilitation. The
approach is premised on the view that children cannot tolerate prolonged delay while their
parents relapse into harmful behavior.121 As one trial court put it, “children cannot afford to
spend the rest of their childhood waiting for their father and mother to also grow up.”122
Courts are bound by the record in determining parental “fault” and in attempting to
predict whether a child can be safe with that parent in the future.123 According to the
American Psychological Association, specific evidence of past behavior is the best basis for

the parents or any other gua rdian in whose care the child has b een for at least twelve mo nths; (4) the child’s
age; (5 ) the pa rent’s efforts to address the conditions which led to the child’s remo val; (6) the parent’s
visitation with the child while the child was in out-of-home placement; (7) and the extent, if any, to which
the parent’s effort to maintain a relationship with the child were constrained by unreasonable acts on the
part of any other p erson or b y the parent’s econo mic circumstanc es. C O N N . G EN . S TAT .. § 17a-112 (k)(1-7).
See also A LASKA S TAT . § 47 .10.0 88 (d)(4 -5) (2002 ) (stating that a petition to terminate parental rights is
appropriate where the parent has made “three or more attempts . . . to remedy the parent’s conduct or
conditions in the home without lasting chan ge; or . . . a p arent has made no effort to re med y the parent’s
conduct or the cond itions in the home by the time of the perm anency hearing . . . .”); A RIZ . R EV . S TAT ..
A N N .§ 8-533 (B)(7)(b) (West 2003) (“[T]he parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances which
cause the child to be in an ou t-of-hom e plac ement and there is a su bstantial likelihoo d that the parent will
not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.”).
121

See In re Crystal E., 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3305, *80-82 (2001) (granting termination based on
mother’s “failure to rehabilitate” despite intensive services where the mother, who was raised in a series of
foster homes herself, had a juvenile record and dropped out of school after ninth grade, persisted in criminal
activity, substance abuse, aggressive b ehavior, relationship s with viole nt men and a continuing inability to
meet her child ’s need s). As the court explained, “C rystal, who has languished so long in foster care, ‘should
not be further burd ened by having to wa it for her m other to achieve the level of rehab ilitation nec essary to
parent her.’” Id. at *72.
122

State D ep’t of H uman Resourc es v. A.K ., 851 So.2 d 1, 9 (2002) (reversing the trial court’s re fusal to
terminate parental rights and committing the three children to a residential facility instead of an identified
ado ptive home as an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 851 So.2d 2 3 (Ala. Nov. 27, 200 2).
123

States vary in their approach to what period of time the court may look at when determining fault. In
Connecticut, the court may only consider the parent’s behavior up to the date when the state filed the
petition to terminate parental rights. In re Daniel C., 776 A.2d 487 , 500 (2001 ). In other jurisdictions, the
court considers evidence pertaining to the parents’ behavior up to the date of trial, which arguably gives the
court a mo re comple te picture. See In re the W elfare o f Chosa, 29 0 N .W . 2d 7 66, 7 69 (Minn. 19 80), cited in
In re the Welfare of D.T.O., 1999 W L 4310 93, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 29, 1999 ).
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prediction of future behavior.124 Records in termination cases are replete with evidence of
past behavior on which to premise predictions of future parenting behavior. There is,
however, no easy checklist that agencies and courts can rely upon in their effort to predict
whether a child can be safe with his or her parents. As psychologists explain, “[e]ach case is
unique, often involving complex and confusing facts, and the stakes – the safety and welfare
of a child – are very high.”125
A modification of the predictive approach emphasizes the extent to which prediction
is based on past acts for which the parent may equitably be held responsible. In Minnesota,
for example, the statute provides for termination of parental rights on the grounds that the
child “is neglected and in foster care.”126 This ground for termination applies to children
who have been placed in foster care by court order, who cannot currently be returned to their
parents, and “whose parents, despite the availability of needed rehabilitative services, have
failed to make reasonable efforts to adjust their circumstances, condition or conduct. . . .”127
The court is directed to make findings regarding how long the child has been in foster care,
as well as about the parent’s efforts to rehabilitate and to maintain contact with the child, and
whether the state offered reasonable services to the parent. These latter two factors attempt
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Joan B. Gerbasi, Richard Bo nnie & Renee L. B inder, Resource Document on Mandatory Outpatient
Treatment, 28 J. A M . A CAD . P S Y C H IA T RY L. 12 7, 14 2 (2000 ) (stating that in the context of civil
commitment, predictions of “future dangerousness . . . should be based on the occurrence of such episodes
in the recent past.”).
125

Raelene Freitag & Madeline Wordes, Improved Decision Making in Child Maltreatment Cases, 3 J. C TR .
F AM ., C HILD . & C TS . 75, 75 (2001 ) (explaining how risk assessment tools help to categorize families, but
do not provide a reliable predictor of specific behavior).
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M IN N . S TAT . § 260C.30 1 (1)(b)(8) (2003 ).
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M IN N . S TAT . § 260C.00 7 (24)(c) (2003 ).
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to focus the court on parental behavior while the child has been in foster care rather than on
the mere passage of time.
In contrast to Minnesota’s approach, the terms of ASFA sidestep the relationship
between the passage of 15 months in foster care and the imperative that the state must
establish parental fault. In circumventing the constitutional requirement that the state prove
parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence before terminating parental rights, the
law does a disservice to both parents and children. Children who have been in foster care for
fifteen months or more, who are not likely to return home safely in the near future, and for
whom a permanent home has been identified should be able to take advantage of ASFA and
be legally adopted and integrated into new families. But if the state fails to come to grips
with its burden to prove parental unfitness, it may wrongfully deprive parents and children
of a legally protected relationship that is beneficial to the children and unwittingly subject
such children to continuing uncertainty in the form of a lengthy appeals process.
In order for ASFA’s 15/22 month provision to survive wider appellate scrutiny,
the state (including both the child welfare and court systems) bears the onus of keeping
each case on schedule in accordance with the statute’s time lines and of insuring that
parents receive the services they need. If the state were to accomplish these goals, any
efforts to terminate parental rights in neglect cases would necessarily be based on
allegations of persistent unfitness in the face of opportunities to change and not merely
the passage of time. The burden on the state promotes the child’s legal and
developmental interests as well as the parent’s rights because the child may not be well
served by an unnecessary permanent separation from a parent whom the child regards as
his or her primary caretaker.
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In addition to the individual children whose unique histories indicate that they
should not be severed from their parents, there are identifiable and predictable subclasses of children who should not be permanently separated from their mothers based
solely on the clock running out at fifteen months. Examples of these circumstances are
the focus of the next section.
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III. Hard Categories, Harder Cases
Current federal law retains the prevention and reunification provisions that were
enacted as part of the Child Welfare Act of 1980.128 ASFA modifies the “reasonable efforts”
provisions of the 1980 Act by providing that some small proportion of children have been
hurt so badly, and some parents are so clearly incapable of transformation, that in those
cases, time and resources should not be wasted on fruitless efforts that disserve children who
will never go home.129 In all other instances, ASFA as integrated with pre-existing law
requires that “reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families.”130
“Reasonable efforts” include providing services that would “prevent or eliminate the need
for removing the child from the child’s home,” as well as services following removal “to
make it possible for a child to safely return to the child’s home.”131 Consistent with its
vision of termination after a child has remained in foster care for 15 months, however,
ASFA specifies that the state is no longer obligated to provide services to the family after the
expiration of the 15 month period.132

128

See discussion, supra note 100.
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42 U.S.C.A. § 67 1 (a)(15)(D) (defining the “aggravated circumstances” which eliminate the requirement
that the state make “reasonable efforts” to preserve the family).
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42 U.S.C.A. § 67 1 (a)(15)(B).
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Id.
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Pub. L. 105-89 § 1305 (b)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 629a (7)(A)) (time-limited family reunification
services designed to “facilitate the reunification of the child safety” apply “only during the 15-month period
that begins on the date that the child . . . is considered to have entered foster care.”). Some states provide
services for a shorter period of time. In Utah, a parent may not receive reunification services for more than
twelve m onths, o r, if child is und er three years of age, eigh t months. U T A H C ODE A N N . § 78-3a-311
(2)(c)(iii), (2)(f) (2003). Such statutes underscore that the “overarching purpose” of the child welfare laws
is to “provide stability and permanency for abused and neglected children” by indicating a clear legislative
intent that “ a parent wishing reunification with his or her child must act quickly towards that end.” Utah v.
S.L., 995 P .2d 1 7, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1 999 ).
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By allowing the state to curtail services for the mother after a child has been in foster
care for 15 months (regardless of when the mother actually began to receive the services),
ASFA may exacerbate the constitutional infirmities of the 15/22 months rule, as viewed
from the perspective of the parent’s rights. A range of common parental problems, such as
substance abuse, imprisonment, and domestic violence, are not amenable to speedy
resolution. Under ASFA, each of these problems might form the basis for termination of a
mother’s rights as soon as the fifteen month period expires, even if the child could
potentially be kept safe in the home with sufficient services. Some children of mothers who
have such problems might be better served by preservation of the parental bond than by
termination. An individualized determination of the child’s best interests would weigh such
factors as the child’s age, the specific nature of the mother-child relationship, demonstrated
harm to the child, and the identified placement alternatives. Because ASFA imposes a
categorical imperative that parental rights be terminated after the passage of a certain
amount of time, it does not appear to permit the exercise of judicial discretion in response to
the best interests of those children who would be better off retaining a legal relationship with
their mothers.133
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See U. S. G EN . A CCOUNTING O FFICE , F OSTER C ARE : R ECENT L E G IS LA T IO N H ELPS S TATES F O C U S O N
F IN D IN G P ERMANEN T H OMES FOR C HILDREN , BUT L O N G -S TANDING B ARRIERS R EM AIN , GA O-02-58 5, 6-7
(June 2002).
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A. Substance Abuse.
Substance abuse is highly correlated with child neglect and abuse. When
Congress adopted ASFA, it noted that, along with poverty, substance abuse is “one of the
three most common reasons for children entering foster care.”134 Substance abuse occurs
in “up to 80% of substantiated abuse and neglect cases.”135 Both alcohol dependency and
regular use of illegal substances show a high correlation with child neglect, although
direct causation has not been demonstrated.136 The General Accounting Office reports
that most children in foster care have at least one parent who abuses one or more illegal
drugs such as cocaine, methamphetamines or heroin, and most parents who use illegal
substances have done so for five years or more, suggesting that they will not be readily
amenable to rehabilitation.137
The common relationship between the removal of children from their homes and
a variety of biases involving race, class and other norms has been widely noted, and some
of those factors may also be implicated in child welfare cases involving substance
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H. R. Rep. No. 105-77 at 19.
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Id. Other commentators point to a smaller but still impressive percentage of substance abuse among the
parents of children in the child welfare system. M ary O’Flynn, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997: Ch ang ing Ch ild Welfare P olicy Witho ut Add ressing Parental Substan ce Ab use, 16 J. C O N TE M P.
H E A LT H L. & P O L’Y 243, 245 (1999)(stating that two thirds of the children within the child welfare system
surveye d had at least on e parent with a substance abuse problem ). For purp oses o f the discu ssion he re, it is
not material whether substance abuse causes child maltreatment or whether caseworkers become involved
with families where substance abuse is suspected because the caseworkers believe that abuse and
maltreatment are linked.
The text accompanying footnotes 135-150 is indebted to research assistance provided by Eliza Kaiser,
University of Pennsylvania Law School class of 2002.
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Physically Abusing or Neglecting Children, 153:7 A M . J. P SYCHIATRY 921, 923 , 926-27 (199 6).
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U. S. G EN . A CCOUNTING O FFICE , F OSTER C ARE : A GENCIES F ACING C HALLENGES S ECURING S TAB LE
H OMES FOR C HILDREN O F S UBSTANCE A BUSERS , GAO/HEHS-98-182, 2 (Sept. 1998).
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abuse.138 It is, however, misguided to ignore the pernicious effects that parental
substance abuse may have on children, regardless of the precise substance of choice.139
Substance abuse can alter judgment, diminish impulse control, and stimulate aggression.
At the core of the problem, substance abuse may make it impossible for a parent to
perceive – much less respond to -- a child’s needs. The inability to perceive the world
around her accurately often interferes with the parent’s ability to minister to the child’s
most basic needs.140 As one teenager reflected, looking back on a substance-abusing
mother, “I realize that drugs were more important than me, that I didn’t come first in my
mother’s life. She wasn’t worried about if I ate or where I slept – she was more worried
about drugs.”141 Another teen summarized her experience with a substance-abusing
mother, saying, “She was always off doin’ her own thing. She wasn’t even really a
mom.”142
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See generally D O R O T HY R OBERTS , S H A T TE R ED B O N D S : T HE C OLOR O F C H IL D W ELFARE (2002); P EGGY
C OOPER D AV IS , N E G LE C TE D S TORIES: T HE C O N S TIT U TIO N A N D F A M IL Y V ALUES (1997); Catherine J. Ross,
Families Without Paradigms: Child Poverty and Out-of-Home Placement in Historical Perspective, 60
O H IO S T . L. J. 1249, 125 6-61, 1291-92 (1999).
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See E L IZ AB E TH B ARTHOLET , N O B O D Y ’S C HILDREN : A B U S E A N D N EGLECT , F OSTER D R IF T A N D T HE
A D O P TIO N A LTERNATIVE , 67-81, 207 -32 (1 999 ). But cf. Mabry, supra note 20, at 620 n.84. (“On the other
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For purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to enter into the debate over
whether substance abuse has its genesis in illness, is a rational response to stress, or
results from moral failings.143 From the perspective of the ASFA timeline, the critical
issue is that “parents are frequently ordered to undergo drug treatment or other
counseling as a condition to regaining custody of a child in foster care. Given the
realities of limited funding, it is not uncommon for there [sic] to be waiting lists to
receive such services.”144 Thirty-nine of the 46 states that responded to a recent federal
survey reported that they lacked sufficient drug treatment programs.145 The dearth of
services is even more pronounced for women than for men.146 Social workers report that
many women feel trapped - they fear that if they voluntarily enter a treatment program,
they run the risk that their children will be removed from them and placed in foster
care.147 Policies that result in forced separation of children from mothers who enter
treatment programs run counter to research suggesting that mothers who are able to keep
their children while in treatment are more likely to complete treatment successfully. 148
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Judg es have bee n criticized for b eing unclear abou t the genesis of sub stance abuse and arbitrary in their
recommendations fo r possible treatment. See Richa rd C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment And The Drug
Treatment Court Movement, 76 W ASH . U. L.Q . 120 5, 12 30-3 4 (1998 ).
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In re H .G., 757 N.E.2d at 872 (lamenting the fact that if the state makes “reasonable effort[s] to get the
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U.S. D EP ’T OF H E A LT H & H U M A N S ERVICES , B LENDING P E R SP E CT IV E S A N D B UILDING C O M M O N
G R O U N D , A R E P O RT T O C O N G R ES S O N S UBSTANCE A B U S E A N D C H IL D P R O T EC T IO N (Apr. 1999). T his report
was prepared in respo nse to A SFA ’s recognition that substance abuse services need to b e mo re closely
linked to child protective services. H.R. Rep. N o. 105-77, at 15 (requiring HHS to report on the problem).
147
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Even where services are available, substance abusers often require several courses
of treatment before they stop relapsing (and some never succeed in breaking the cycle of
addiction or significantly improve their ability to function).149 From the vantage point of
a mother’s parental rights, this suggests that when the state removes children because of
neglect stemming from a mother’s substance abuse, the 15-month clock is likely to run
before a mother can establish that she has successfully completed treatment. The running
of the clock is of equal concern from the child’s point of view if it means that the child
loses the chance to have a sound relationship with a parent because timely,
comprehensive treatment is not available for that parent.150
The likelihood that a mother will regain custody of a child who has entered the
child welfare system is further diminished if the mother is incarcerated as a result of her
abuse of illegal substances. As many as eighty percent of incarcerated women are
mothers, and most of those are single mothers.151 Nearly two-thirds of women in state
prisons report that their children lived with them until they were incarcerated.152 If a
woman is in prison because of drug related offenses, the court may have been required to
sentence her under mandatory sentencing guidelines without discretion to consider the
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See E.g., N O R M A N K. D EN ZIN , T REATING A LC O HO LIS M 88 (1987) (estimating that up to seventy percent
of those com pleting rehab ilitation for alcoho l abuse relapse within six months).
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CASA at 8 (“Every child has a right to have his or her substance-abusing parents get a fair shot at
recovery with timely and comprehensive treatment.”).
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Mariely D owney, Losing More Than Time: Incarcerated Mothers and the Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1997, 9 B UFF . W OMEN ’S L.J. 41, 41 , 45 (2 001 ); See also Leslie A coca & M yrna S. Raeder, Severing
Family Ties: The Plight of Nonviolent Female Offenders and Their Children, 11 S TAN . L. & P O L’Y R EV .
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Christo pher J. M umo la, Incarcerated Parents and Their Children, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special
Report NCJ 182335 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice) Aug. 2000 at 4.
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impact of the sentence on her children.153 When men who live with their children enter
prisons, over 90% report that the children remain with the child’s other parent; only one
percent of children of male inmates entered foster care.154 In stark contrast, only 28% of
women prisoners report that their children are living with the children’s father.155
Although over half of the children of women prisoners live with grandparents or other
relatives, nearly 10% of women prisoners report that their children have entered foster
care – putting them at risk of termination of parental rights since the average mother in a
state prison is expected to remain there for 49 months.156
If applied mechanistically, the 15/22 months rule would be a death knell for the
parental rights of all parents with children in foster care who remain in jail for more than
a year and a half. From the vantage point of the incarcerated mother who wishes to retain
a relationship with her child, the state’s reliance on the 15/22 months rule seems patently
unfair. As one women’s advocate explained, “[f]or many inmates, children are a lifesustaining force. To break that bond is a punishment of the worst kind.”157 In order to
avoid categorical severance of the parental rights of all incarcerated women, courts could
perform an individualized assessment. Such an assessment could examine the mother’s
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Id. at 6; Nicole S . Mausko pf, Reaching Beyond the Bars: An Analysis of Prison Nurseries, 5 C ARD OZO
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Aco ca & Raeder, supra note 151, at 136.
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Id. at 1, 3. In contrast, less than 2% of male state or federal prisoners who lived with their children before
entering prison report that their children are in foster care. The data do not indicate whether any of the
children in foster care are in a kinship foster care arrangement, in which case ASFA wo uld not require the
state to file a petition to terminate parental rights (“TPR”).
157
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fault and predict her future behavior by looking at such factors as whether she has
pursued opportunities for treatment, cooperated with and completed services that were
made available, relapsed and tested positive for drugs, experienced further arrests, and
whether she used every available means to maintain contact with her child (such as
writing letters, calling and seeking visits). Unfortunately, effective treatment programs
for women involved with the criminal justice system are virtually non-existent.158 But
under ASFA, the incarcerated mother could permanently lose her rights to her child even
if she made every feasible effort to rehabilitate herself, communicate with her children or
have them visit her in jail.159 Regardless of what the court finds about the relationship
between a particular mother and her child, the 15/22 months are likely to expire while the
mother remains in prison.
Even where courts insist that the state establish a ground for termination other
than the passage of time, incarceration is likely to contribute to termination under more
generalized theories of fault. Appellate courts in several states have expressly held that
termination may not be based solely on the parent’s incarceration.160 In most instances,
158

Id. at 138-14 0.
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In the Matter of J.L.N., the Nevada Supreme C ourt found that the mother overcame the statutory
presumption that her child’s best interests would be served by termination. 55 P.3d 955 (20 02), The
mother, who the court noted had no substance abuse problems and had provided a stable home for her
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Id. at 961 (reversing termination); Johnson v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Services, 78 Ark. App. 112,
120, 82 S.W .3d 183, 188 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming termination); In re Depende ncy of J.W. v.
W illiams, 90 W ash. App. 417, 426 , 432, 953 P .2d 104, 109 , 112 (W ash. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming
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however, courts treat incarceration as a factor in determining whether the parent will be
able to resume parenting obligations, looking at “factors being related to incarceration”
rather than deciding to terminate parental rights based “solely” on the fact of
incarceration.161
Commentators have largely overlooked two recent changes to the federal law,
which courts are likely to erroneously view as “factors being related to incarceration”
bearing on a mother’s ability to resume parenting responsibility. First, as part of the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) legislation, Congress “stipulated
that persons convicted of a state or federal felony offense involving the use or sale of
drugs are subject to a lifetime ban on receiving cash assistance and food stamps.”162
Forty-two states are enforcing the ban in full or in part and, although it applies only to
benefits for the mother, it is likely to diminish the household income of paroled drug
offenders significantly and result in the mother’s “neglect” of children who have been
returned to her.163 In a second development during 1996, the federal government
authorized local Public Housing Authorities to obtain criminal records and to use

termination); In re R.P., M.P. and G.P., III, 498 N.W .2d 364, 368 (S.D. 1993) (affirming termination); In
the Interest of P.O.M ., 255 Ga. App . 534, 536, 566 S.E.2d 334 , 337 (Ga. Ct. App. 20 02) (affirming
termination) (citing In the Interest of R.H., 240 Ga. App. 551, 553(2), 524 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999 ));
In re Interest of Brettany M. et al. v. Brett W., 11 Neb. App. 104, 120, 123, 644 N.W.2d 574, 587, 590
(Neb. Ct. App. 200 2) (affirming termination).
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Patricia Allard, Life Sentences: Denying Welfare Benefits to Women Convicted on Drug Offenses
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following a conviction” affecting 92,000 wo men as of Decemb er 2001 and calling for repeal of the
provision as likely to lead to the dissolution of families).
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information about drug convictions to deny public housing to people “hav[ing] a drug
conviction or are suspected of drug involvement.”164 This provision may not only bar
mothers convicted of drug offenses from obtaining public housing, it also may mean that
they cannot stay with relatives in public housing without subjecting their hosts to the risk
of eviction. The combined blow of a lifetime ban on welfare benefits and lack of access
to public housing severely diminishes the prospect that a mother newly released from
prison will be able to convince authorities that she can provide a safe home for her
children. Since ASFA provides that the state does not have to engage in “reasonable
efforts” after a child has been in foster care for 15 out of 22 months, the poverty that
results from a mother’s status as a drug offender may be transformed into an unwarranted
justification for permanently severing her from her children.
In the absence of broader social reform, however, termination because a
relationship has withered while a parent is in prison fulfills ASFA’s intention to require
the law to look at foster care through the child’s eyes. From the viewpoint of a young
child, it may not matter why her mother is unable to care for her. What matters is that
whatever stability she once had has been disrupted, her mother has not been her primary
psychological parent and, perhaps (if she is lucky), someone else now occupies that place
in her life.
Conflict between the needs of the child and the desires of the parent may be
brought to a head even before termination is an issue. The mother may have a right to
maintain her relationship with her child even while using drugs or incarcerated, but the
164

Id. at 12 (citing H ousing Op portunity Pro gram Extension A ct of 19 96, P ub. L. No. 104 -120 (1996)).
For a discussion o f how this p olicy underm ines the “authority of poor black an d brown” mo thers over their
childre n, see R egina A ustin, “Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother’s Back”: Poor Moms, Myths of
Authority, and Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 14 Y ALE J. L. & F EMINISM 273 (200 2).
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child may have an equally strong claim not to have contact with a parent if such contact
is more harmful than beneficial. Consider, for example, a young child in a stable, preadoptive foster home, who has no memory of either of his drug-addicted parents. One
parent—who is still addicted to crack—has vanished, and cannot be located by the child
welfare agency. The other parent, who is in prison on charges related to drugs and has
not seen the child for several years, requests that the agency bring the child for a visit and
the agency complies. As a result of contact with his virtually unknown parent in jail, the
child experiences severe developmental setbacks. These setbacks include rage, severe
enuresis, and other behavioral manifestations so pronounced that the foster parents
reconsider whether they want to adopt the boy, ultimately asking the agency to remove
him from their home. Meanwhile, the parent is granted parole, expects to be released
shortly, and seeks custody. 165
How should a court respond to an absent parent’s demands for continued
visitation and custody? The child’s best interests must weigh heavily in the decision, but
that is not necessarily a sufficient response to the claims of parental rights, especially if
the parent has completed drug counseling and was a model prisoner. On the other hand,
it is hard to imagine how a parent newly released from prison, without an apartment or a
job, whose kin were not available to care for the boy when the parent was sentenced, will
be able to handle the stresses of parenting a demanding child while seeking to adjust to
life after prison. These conflicting priorities of mothers’ rights and children’s needs may
165

This example is based on a consultation by the author. In this instance, the parent who disappeared was
the mother, and the imprisoned parent was the father, but the sex of the imprisoned parent does not affect
the analysis. A remarkably similar reported case is Depen den cy of J.W.,953 P.2d 10 4, except that J.W .’s
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52

be irreconcilable both as a matter of generally applicable law and as applied to specific
cases. Congress concluded that such conflicts must be resolved in favor of the child’s
needs, whether or not the mother is at “fault” in the sense of intent, omission or other
facts suggesting accountability as opposed to strict liability. When a court is confronted
with such a choice, the child’s interest outweighs the parent’s claim because the
legislature has made it clear that the consequences of any other decision are too harmful
to the child and, ultimately, to society.166 As the State of Washington’s highest court
pronounced even prior to the ASFA regime, “when the rights of parents and the welfare
of their children are in conflict, the welfare of the minor children must prevail.”167
This child-centered view does not depend on any interpretation of mothers as
good or bad, self-sacrificing or selfish. It reflects the law’s intervention as defender of
those least able to protect themselves; even where women have been victimized or
unfairly treated, the law presumes that adult women can rise to their own defense at least
to some extent but that children cannot. Even within that framework, however, the
principle of balancing irreconcilable claims in favor of the child rather than the mother
should not allow the law to sidestep the analytical question of how to reconcile placing
children first with the liberty interests of parents, as it attempts to do under ASFA’s
15/22 month rule.
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In the final section of this paper I turn to a category of cases involving domestic
violence, in which the independent but mutually supportive interests and liberty claims of
mother and child may remain congruent in the face of the challenge the 15/22 month rule
poses to their ability to survive as a family.
B. Battered Mothers and Their Children.
A large number of incarcerated women, presumably including some of the jailed
substance abusers discussed in the previous section, have experienced domestic abuse.168
But many other victims of domestic violence who have no history of drug abuse, have
never been imprisoned and have neither abused nor neglected their children, the women
who are the focus of this section, are also at risk of having their children removed from
their care. Advocates for battered women and their children have succeeded in
promoting the widespread realization that children who witness domestic violence are its
victims even if the children do not suffer physical trauma themselves.169 This
development, however, had an unanticipated effect when it resulted in the removal of
children from battered mothers who had succeeded in protecting them from witnessing
any abuse, or who had successfully extricated themselves from their relationships with
their abusers.170
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Mothers who are victims of domestic violence too often become the subjects of
“double abuse,” in the words of District Court Judge Jack Weinstein: first by a partner
and then by the state “through forced unnecessary separation of the mothers from their
children on the excuse that this sundering is necessary to protect the children.”171 In re
Nicholson, a case that should become a landmark, Judge Weinstein considered the claims
of a class of battered mothers whose children were deemed neglected by the New York
City Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS” or “the City”) solely because the
mother was a victim of domestic abuse. (The court also considered the claims of a courtcreated subclass of their children.)172 Judge Weinstein reflected early on that the case
involved “three sometimes conflicting principles”:
First, as a parent, a mother has rights to uninterrupted custody of her
children and a child has rights to remain with parents; within wide limits,
adults and children in a household are immune from state prying and
intrusion. Second, domestic abuse – particularly if physical – of a mother
or child will not be tolerated. Third, the state has the obligation to protect
children from abuse, including, where clearly necessary to protect the
child, the power to separate the mother and child.173
The court held that the City had violated the right of mothers and children to live together
(the first principle) by misconstruing its mandate not to tolerate domestic abuse (the
second principle) and by unjustifiably relying on that mandate when it misused its power

that the court must consider the issue of domestic violence in determining custody disputes, when raised by
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to separate children from their mothers in order to protect the children from abuse (the
third principle).174
The ten women named as plaintiffs in Nicholson display remarkable similarities.
Not one plaintiff mother had struck or physically abused her child. In each instance, one
or more children were removed from a battered mother either because the batterer had
also attacked the child (and the mother had “failed to protect the child”),175 or more
commonly, because the mother either had not extricated herself from the abusive
situation or, in the process of trying to separate from her abuser, entered a transitional
situation that was not deemed appropriate for the child (such as no longer having an
apartment to live in). Indeed, the definition of the class omitted battered mothers who had
abused their children or were still failing to protect their children from abusers.176 In
many instances, mothers included in the class had been charged with neglect or abuse
based on strict liability, even though their children had not witnessed the abuse and had
not suffered either physical or emotional harm in the mother’s home.177
The sharp parallels to the problems that ASFA’s 15/22 months rule creates for
mothers with histories of substance abuse, discussed above in Part III.A, are readily
apparent, including the reluctance of many mothers to seek help (even if it were
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available) due to fear that scrutiny will lead to removal of the children from the mother’s
home.178 Mothers who are victims of domestic violence, however, have an even stronger
argument than substance abusers that they are not “at fault,” especially in light of the
many obstacles to separating from an abusive situation. These obstacles include the
increased physical danger to the woman and her children in the period immediately
following her departure, the lack of domestic violence shelters, an inability to find
permanent housing, and a lack of employment.179
The interaction of the City’s treatment of abused mothers and the ASFA time line
was not an issue in Nicholson,180 and the record does not indicate that any of the named
class representatives in Nicholson suffered the termination of parental rights (perhaps in
part because they were well represented once they became part of the class). But the
issues of removal, passage of time, and delay are likely to mean that some proportion of
mothers who are victims of domestic violence will lose their children permanently, for no
other reason than that City agencies acted with “benign indifference” while the clock ran
to 15 months.181
178
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The child’s independent interest in remaining with his or her mother and siblings
or, alternatively, in maintaining a legal relationship with her biological family constitutes
a corollary of the mother’s interest in preserving her parental rights.182 ASFA imposes a
legal presumption that every child who has been in foster care for 15 out of 22 months
would be better off severing ties with her biological parents and moving into a new
permanent situation, unless the case falls within one of the three enumerated exceptions.
It assumes that although the natural parent may continue to speak legally for the child
until the termination proceedings are completed, the state, advocating termination, more
accurately represents the child’s best interest. In many, or even most, instances, this may
be true, especially in cases involving physical abuse of the child. But ASFA leaves no
discretion for taking into account the individual child’s interest in remaining with her
natural family.183
The psychological and emotional detriment to a child who is separated
unnecessarily from a parent (and siblings) has been well documented.184 The child
suffers the trauma of separation, leading to such symptoms as fear, anxiety, depression, a
diminished sense of self and regressive behavior.185 All of the symptoms associated with
182

Comm entators have long noted that “the child’s best interests would be better served by removing the
abuser from the family than by re mov ing the child from the home.” Rachel Venier, Parental Rights and the
Best Interests of the Child: Im plications o f the Adop tion a nd S afe F am ilies Act o f 199 7 on Do mestic
Violence Victim s’ Rights, 8 AM . U.J. G ENDER S O C . P O L’Y & L. 51 7, 53 4 (2000 ); See also Annette R.
Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection
System, 48 S.C. L. R EV . 577, 588 (1997). Of course, this approach only works when the mother is prepared
to leave her abuser.
183

ASF A provides that older adolescents have the right to decline adop tion.

184

See generally J O H N B OWLBY , A T T AC H E M EN T : A T T AC H M E N T (1969); J O H N B OWLBY , A T T AC H M E N T:
S E P AR A TIO N , A N X IE T Y A N D A NGER (1973); J O H N B OWLBY , A T T AC H M E N T: L OSS , S A D N E SS A N D
D E P RE S SIO N (1980).
185

Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 198-200 (quoting expert testimony).

58

loss occur at the same time that the child “confront[s] an unfamiliar and often dangerous
foster care system,” including the frequent pattern of separation from friends,
neighborhood and school.186 Children frequently believe that they are responsible for the
breakup of the family following domestic violence just as they do in cases of divorce.
The intensity of those feelings may be exaggerated where the state intercedes due to
domestic violence because the child does not know whether the battered parent is safe.187

One expert has explained that “taking a child whose greatest fear is separation
from his or her mother and in the name of ‘protecting’ that child [by] forcing on them,
what is in effect, their worst nightmare, . . . is tantamount to pouring salt on an open
wound.”188 Such evidence materially undermines any claim that the state serves the
child’s best interests when it separates children from mothers who are victims of
domestic violence.189
The right of a mother and child to remain together arguably does not belong to the
mother alone. The Second Circuit recognized a “right to the preservation of family
integrity encompassing the reciprocal rights of both parent and children a quarter of a
century ago in Duchesne v. Sugarman.190 Finding a “mutual interest in an interdependent
186
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relationship,” the Court of Appeals identified what it labeled “consistent support” in
Supreme Court decisions concerning the rights of parents.191 In Nicholson, Judge
Weinstein expanded this doctrine by enunciating an interest in “familial integrity,” which
guarantees all family members a right not to be separated from each other.192
Supreme Court opinions skirt the issue but offer some support for the argument
that the liberty interest is reciprocal.193 In Michael H. v. Gerald D., for example, the
plurality expressly noted that the Court “never had occasion to decide whether a child has
a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial
relationship” and declined to do so in what it construed as a case involving a claim to
preserve a child’s relationships with two “fathers,” one biological and one—the mother’s
husband—statutory.194 In a compelling dissent Justice Brennan went a step further. He
recognized that the relationship between the biological father and his child constituted “a
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liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause,” and acknowledged the child’s
claim that she too had a “liberty interest” in that relationship.195
I have argued in a variety of other contexts that children may have liberty
interests independent of their parents, and that the law should take the young person’s
expression of those interests seriously.196 Applied to ASFA, this argument suggests that
where child and parent each assert a complementary independent liberty interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship, the court should weigh the child’s argument
heavily. Despite its intended focus on the child, ASFA, as currently designed, does not
afford courts the opportunity to take the individual child’s views into account. Allowing
a child’s views to be heard does not mean that the child’s preferences will trump all other
arguments. Among other things, even seriously abused children frequently have strong
feelings of attachment to their abusers, and the child’s safety should remain paramount.
ASFA also fails to take the different needs of children of varying ages into
account in formulating the 15/22 months rule. Age is one of the factors that should
weigh for or against termination because the child’s age has predictable consequences. A
child’s age affects the depth of the relationship between the child and the biological
parent, as well as the child’s memory of that relationship. The infant placed at birth will
obviously have no experience with her biological mother, and may have a welldeveloped relationship with a foster family, while the 14-year old may have positive
feelings toward her mother, and regard the foster family as a recent intrusion. Equally
important, if the state terminates the biological mother’s parental rights to a 14-year-old,
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she is likely to become a “legal orphan” – a child who is legally free for adoption but for
whom the state cannot find an adoptive home.197 Whether or not they are freed for an
adoption that remains only a fantasy, many adolescents who graduate from foster care
turn to their biological families for support. If the parental rights of the biological parent
have been terminated, legal services lawyers report, teenagers “often come back and say
to us, ‘You know, I want that termination vacated because I want to have a connection
with my biological family.’”198
Existing sibling relationships may be a factor in the resistance some older
children mount to adoption because termination of parental rights also terminates the
legal relationship between siblings who may be placed separately. Many children in
foster care have indicated that one of the most painful parts of their experience was the
loss of siblings.199 When one sibling is adopted, and others remain in foster care, they
often lose touch with each other completely.200 Termination also severs ties with other
197
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blood relatives including grandparents, aunts, and uncles, with whom the child may have
a beneficial relationship of long standing.
Some young people are sophisticated enough to fight to retain important family
ties. One 14-year-old resisted an adoptive placement that involved moving out of a foster
home in which he had resided for eight years. He insisted that his younger sister needed
him and talked about setting up a household in which he and his sister could live
together. He fantasized that if the parental rights of his severely neglectful and detached
mother were terminated, he would claim custody of his sister from wherever she had
been placed when he graduated from the system at age eighteen. Responding to the
state’s notion that he could no longer linger in the legal limbo of foster care for the four
years that remained of his minority, he stated simply, “the law is retarded.”201 He may
have been too harsh. But in this instance the law may be “doctrinally challenged.” The
complexity of parental termination cases may not be amenable to the attractive simplicity
of a timeline or any other mechanistic solution. It may not be possible to respond
categorically to the needs of all vulnerable children. The application of general principles
to specific cases may be more likely to lead to sensitive decisions about each neglected
child. This approach would not require us to throw out the ASFA reforms, but rather
would call for continued tinkering. The ultimate goal should be to replace blanket
presumptions – whether they favor parents, as in the old regime, or children, as in the
ASFA regime – with nuanced appraisals of individual relationships that enable judges to
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respond to the individual child who is, under ASFA, the proper focus of any termination
proceeding.
IV. Conclusion
Termination and permanency raise issues that cut across many visions of the
rights of children. In the child welfare context, children clearly have a right to be
protected and cared for, if not by their parents, then through the state’s intervention. As
much as children need to be taken care of, simple substitution of one paternalistic
presence (the state) for another (the biological parent) is not sufficiently responsive to
children’s claims. Just as ASFA recognizes that children’s interests may diverge from
those of their parents, so too may the interests of children diverge from the presumptions
enunciated by the state. From the perspective of rights theory, children often have both a
procedural and substantive interest in preserving family relationships that benefit them
and a correspondingly strong claim to be legally free to join a new family where the facts
warrant it.
If we lived in a world where no child was ever removed unnecessarily, every
child who was removed returned home as soon as basic safety could be assured, and
well-designed services were available to all who needed them, then a sound legal ground
for termination would generally exist after the passage of 15 months. In such a
hypothetical world, one whose existence ASFA presumes, the state would be able to
demonstrate the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence without
relying on the mere passage of time. In this hypothetical universe, by the time the state
filed for termination of parental rights the claims of mother and child would usually be at
odds just as ASFA presumes them to be.
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In the messier world that mothers and children actually inhabit, cases at the
margins elude easy solutions. These marginal cases raise two separate and equally
important legal problems. First, the mother’s constitutional interests in her relationship
with her child require that the state establish clear individualized grounds for termination.
The passage of time, without more, does not appear to satisfy the heavy burden imposed
on the state. Second, the child in any individual case may be better off retaining a legal
relationship with her mother. Thus, the court considering a petition for termination
should be required to hear any arguments a child offers for preserving the relationship
and should have discretion to take those arguments into account. Both of these issues
may be addressed if courts are required to assess the likelihood that an individual parent
will be a fit or unfit parent for the individual child in the near future, rather than relying
solely on a categorical 15-month rule.
The irrebuttable presumption embedded in ASFA’s 15/22 month rule fails to do
justice to every mother and every child that appear in a termination proceeding. The rule
prevents courts from considering the narratives of each individual mother and child and
of their unique relationship. It ignores context in favor of a bright line rule. In
accounting for a child’s sense of time and need for continuity, the resolution of each
child’s case requires consideration of the individual child’s unique strengths,
vulnerabilities, personal history and desires. The law a crude instrument at best needs to
endeavor to respond flexibly to the minority of cases in which an individual child would
be better off returning to his or her mother even after the passage of time.
The lack of clear legal grounds for termination under the 15/22 months rule is the
elephant in the room that no one wants to talk about. The legal grounds for termination
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after 15 months in foster care must be clarified, and the standards must address due
process concerns. Clarification would reassure both child welfare agencies and the courts
that hear their termination petitions that “permanent” decisions will withstand subsequent
judicial review in the rare instances where an appeal is filed. Sensitivity to the
constitutional stakes for parents is doctrinally required. A predictive approach, involving
judicial scrutiny of whether a parent is likely to be able to resume safe parenting within
the child’s time frame, is the test least likely to violate constitutional rights. The
predictive approach at its best would integrate consideration of the child’s best interests
with assessment of parental fault by asking whether this individual parent would be able
to resume parenting responsibility for this individual child, considering the child’s
specific developmental needs and time frame.
Children whose circumstances diverge from ASFA’s bright line approach to
termination would benefit from restoration of discretion within the parameters of a
rebuttable presumption that children who have been in foster care for 15 of the last 22
months should be legally free to enter a new permanent family. Such restored flexibility
would enable courts to respond appropriately to individual children whose circumstances
do not fit the normative model. An approach that incorporates this flexibility without
giving judges unlimited discretion might even help both mother and child come to terms
with the court’s decision regardless of who “wins” and who “loses” in any given
termination proceeding. A clear nexus between the passage of time and a
constitutionally sufficient showing of parental fault would help to insure that the
relationship between mother and child is not terminated needlessly in cases where their
interests converge, and would also enable courts to take into account the unique child’s
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point of view, rather than the viewpoint the state imputes to all similarly situated
children.
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